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FROM PEDAGOGICAL SOCIOLOGY TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE MEANING
OF DESEGREGATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH AND LAW
Anne Richardson Oakes*
In the United States following the case of Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) federal judges with responsibility for public school desegregation but no
expertise in education or schools management appointed experts fron the social
sciences to act as court advisors. In Boston, MA, educational sociologists helped
Judge W. Arthur Garrity design a plan with educational enhancement at its
heart, but the educational outcomes were marginalized by a desegregation
jurisprudence conceptualized in terms of race rather than education.
This Article explores the frustration of outcomes in Boston by reference to the
differing conceptualizations of desegregation in law and social science. It argues that
whereas social scientists see desegregation in terms of social change requiring
integration, for lawyers desegregation is a remedy the content of which is shaped by
the nature of the litigation. The imperatives of law and social science have in the
past coincided in a jurisprudence of afirmative action but the recent school
assignment cases demonstrate the extent to which they have now diverged. This
divergence underlies the indeterminacy of the desegregation mandate and provides an
analytical framework for a theory of the role of the court expert in schools
desegregation.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, in the years following the case of Brown v.
Board of Education,' the federal judiciary assumed direct responsibility
for supervising the desegregation of the nation's schools. In the Brown case
itself, however, the term "desegregation" is never used, and its meaning
has changed over time. Whereas the issue in Brown was the legality of state
laws mandating educational apartheid, under a sympathetic political re-
gime in the 1960s the Supreme Court extended the requirement to
affirmative "integration" and set performance indicators couched in terms
of "racial balance., 2 By the 1990s, however, it was clear that absent state
fault racial identifiability per se did not offend the Constitution, and
judges were encouraged to disengage from the desegregation process.
Affirmative action policies designed to perpetuate "integration" rather
than to remedy past discrimination fell victim to the Court's dislike of
judicial intervention in social policy matters.
It is commonly asserted that the Brown Court was influenced by so-
cial science concerning the "harm" of segregation and the benefits of
integration. In the 1970s, social science research became central to deseg-
regation litigation in the North where segregation was a function of
residential patterns rather than overt legislative discrimination.4 Designing
1. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Technically there were
four cases which were consolidated on appeal to the Supreme Court: Belton v. Gebhart,
87 A.2d. 862 (Del. Ch. 1952) (on appeal from Delaware); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (on appeal from Kansas); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951) (on appeal from South Carolina); and Davis v. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337
(E.D.Va. 1952) (on appeal fromVirginia).
Following the Supreme Court's ruling that the provision of "separate but equal"
education was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the case was adjourned for the
Court to hear argument concerning the remedy. The remedial ruling came one year later
in Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In this text, references to "Brown"
should be taken as references to both Brown I and Brown 11.
2. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 1279-80 (1971).
3. Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70, 92-93 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467,489-491 (1992).
4. See infra Part l.B.
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a desegregation plan in urban centers such as Detroit, MI, required an
analysis of the relationship between school policies,' faculty assignments
and other administrative practices that the state was responsible for, and
other causes of segregation, notably patterns of residence and demo-
graphic factors for which it was not.6 Social science evidence on these
matters became a standard feature of desegregation litigation and the use
7of social science "experts" at both liability and remedy stages was routine.
In cities such as Boston, MA, where elected school officials actively
opposed the desegregation orders of the federal court, district judges who
assumed direct responsibility for desegregation planning appointed social
science experts as their personal advisers, raising due process questions of
legitimacy and transparency in an adversarial context.
In Boston itself, Judge W Arthur Garrity Jr., facing opposition on a
scale unprecedented outside of the South,9 saw desegregation as an op-
portunity to restructure the decayed public school system and chose
advisers who shared his commitment to "educational enhancement."' His
involvement continued for twenty years, but the educational outcomes
were frustrated by the countervailing imperative of "racial balance." In
terms of desegregation jurisprudence, the case was a "race case," not an
"education" case."
5. For example construction, boundary changes, grade level and feeder pattern
changes
6. See infra Part ll.B.
7. See infra Part lI.B.
8. See generally Anne Richardson Oakes, Legitimacy and the Court Expert: Narra-
tives of Impropriety in a Schools Desegregation Case (Nov. 2008)(unpublished draft
manuscript, on file with the author).
9. See RONALD P. FoRMisANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE CLASS AND ETHNIC-
ITY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s (1991). The extent of the violence invited comparisons with
Little Rock, Arkansas: "Some observers, recalling a dramatic outburst of Southern
opposition to desegregation in 1957, now called Boston 'the Little Rock of the North:"
Id. at 1. On September 2, 1957 Governor Orvil Faubus deployed the National Guard to
prevent nine black children from attending Little Rock Central High School, requiring
President Eisenhower to send in Federal troops to protect them and place the National
Guard under federal control. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,8-10 (1958).
10. In Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 480-81 (D. Mass. 1974),Judge Garrity
found that the Boston public school system was unlawfully segregated and announced his
Court desegregation plan in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aft'd, 530
F2d 401,423 (1st Cir. 1976). He appointed as "court experts" Dr Robert Dentler and Dr
Marvin Scott, respectively Dean and Associate Dean of Education, Boston University. Id.
at 227.
11. Transcript of Hearing of April 10 1975, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216
(1975)(No. 72-911-G)(on file with the University of Massachusetts, Healy Library
Archives & Special Collections, Center for Law & Education Papers, Morgan & Hennigan
Case Records 1964-1994). Judge Garrity observed from the bench that "this is a race case,
not a school case primarily" and stated the issue that was going to give him the most
difficulty in formulating an order: Supreme Court jurisprudence protects equality not
education. He stated:
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A. The Paradox of Desegregation Jurisprudence:
Integration and Discrimination
In 1979 after a decade of urban school desegregation, Judge Harvie
Wilkinson wrote that
The problem is that we are no longer certain what kind of
question public school desegregation really is. Twenty years ago
we were convinced it was a matter of showing southern school
segregation to be morally wrong. But with busing, good moral
arguments exist on both sides. To the extent that desegregation
has become less a moral question, or at least more a moral
standoff, it is also less clearly a constitutional requirement the
Supreme Court is entitled to impose.
2
The loss of faith with the desegregation process that took place in Boston
in the 1980s was underpinned by confusion about what exactly the proc-
ess of desegregation was intended to achieve. It raised questions about
what the Constitution might or might not require: how does a right not
to be discriminated against turn into a requirement for racial balance?
What is wrong with freedom of choice and the neighborhood school?
Why must children be bused and schools closed? The Boston plan incor-
porated specific provisions for educational enrichments, but the Court
refused to consider matters of teaching and learning or to take into ac-
count disparities in academic outcomes. 13 When the burdens of busing,
school closures and teacher lay-offs appeared to fall disproportionately
upon the black community, their leaders returned to the issue Brown had
supposedly resolved and asked once again: what exactly is the relationship
between racial isolation and educational opportunity for African Ameri-
"What is protected? Equality is protected. The right to equal education. What that
means is that once the state undertakes to supply education, well, then it must be available
without discrimination among the races. There is a constitutional right to equal education.
That is what this case is all about." Id.
12. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE. THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-78 132 (1979).
13. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 11. Boston's prestigious examination
schools were not required to achieve the same degree of integration as the city's other
magnet schools although their selection policies, progression rates and teaching and learn-
ing methods were thought to disadvantage black students. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. at 243-
244. Robert Dentler took the view that the schools were educationally poor and recom-
mended to the judge that the schools be closed on educational grounds, but general
opposition forced him to withdraw his recommendation. He removed his advice to the
judge before the chambers papers went into the public domain, deposited with the Ar-
chives and Special Collections at the University of Massachusetts Healey Library in
Boston one year after the Morgan litigation was formally closed in 1997. Interview with
Robert Dentler in Boston, MA. (Sept. 14, 2005). Garrity's comments, noted supra note 11,
were typical of his approach to these issues.
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cans?1 4 To seek answers to these questions in key aspects of this branch of
Equal Protection jurisprudence is to discover what desegregation analyst
David J. Armor has termed "the desegregation dilemma,"15 namely the
apparent paradox that Brown v. Board of Education, the case which declared
the constitutional incompatibility of racial discrimination, came itself to
require purposive racial discrimination as an aspect of effective relief.
1 6
As Professor Lino A. Graglia suggests, the history of the law of race
and schools since Brown has seen the Supreme Court convert a prohibi-
tion of segregation into a requirement of integration. 17 In the process, he
argues, a decision that stood as authority for a prohibition on all forms of
racial discrimination became the basis for a new form of racial discrimi-
nation.'8 Public schools were required to conform to requirements of
racial balance.' 9 Access to schools was once again controlled by reference
to considerations of race.2 A constitutional mandate to desegregate to
prevent discrimination became the affirmative requirement to discrimi-
nate to secure integration, despite the assurance given contemporaneously
with Brown I that the Constitution did not require integration.
2
Most commentators have concluded that it was the need to provide
an effective remedy that pushed the Court in the direction of affirmative
action. Two challenges in particular required an effective response. The
first was the attempt by elected officials in Southern states to subvert the
effect of Brown, initially by outright opposition and then by adopting
policies that were overtly race-neutral but which operated in practice to
perpetuate segregation.2 3 Freedom of choice assignment plans fell into
that category.24 By 1968, noting that ten years after Brown a "freedom of
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 3
(1995).
16. Id.
17. See Lino A. Graglia, From Prohibiting Segregation to Requiring Integration: Develop-
ments in the Law of Race and the Schools since Brown, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST,
PRESENT AN'D FUTURE 69 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980)[hereinafter
Graglia, Developments]. See also LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976)[hereinafter Graglia, DISASTER BY
DECREE].
18. See Graglia, Developments, supra note 21 at 69-96.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("Nothing in the Consti-
tution or in the decision [in Brown I] takes away from the people freedom to choose the
schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It
merely forbids discrimination.").
22. See Graglia, Developments, supra note 17 at 75; see also Armor, supra note 15, at
27-28.
23. Practices included the pupil placement laws and freedom of choice plans ex-
plained in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,431-33 (1968).
24. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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choice" policy had made virtually no changes to the racial composition of
the schools of New Kent County (VA) ,25 a unanimous court declared that
"such delays are no longer tolerable" and emphasized that school boards
had a duty to take affirmative action to take "whatever steps might be
necessary" to establish a "unitary non-racial system. 26
The second challenge was the need to respond to segregation in ur-
ban areas where racially identifiable schools reflected residential
segregation coupled with neighborhood school policies. In a case from
North Carolina, the Court had accepted racial balance as a criterion of
desegregation and compulsory busing as an appropriate response to this
27kind of situation. By the time that Judge Garrity came to order his re-
medial plan for Boston, compulsory reassignment of pupils to secure racial
balance in the public schools had become the norm in northern school
desegregation planning, despite its unpopularity with white parents whose
withdrawal to the suburbs made racial balance in urban schools virtually
impossible to achieve.'
25. Under a Virginia pupil placement law adopted after Brown, students were auto-
matically reassigned to schools previously attended unless they specifically applied for
permission to change. See Green, 391 U.S. at 433.
26. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-438.The court further noted the following:
The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot be ac-
cepted as a sufficient step to "effectuate a transition" to a unitary system. In
three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Wat-
kins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school
in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in
the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the
school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of
the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School
Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in the light
of other courses which appear open to the board, such as zoning, fashion
steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
"white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools.
See id. at 441-42.
27. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22, 30 (1971).
28. See generally Robert A. Dentler, School Desegregation Since Gunnar Myrdal's Ameri-
can Dilemma in THE EDUCATION OF ALUcAN AMERICANS, 27-49 (Charles Vert Willie et al.
eds., 1991); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society 80
MIN. LAW REV. 825,825-873 (1996). The precise nature of the relationship between
mandatory desegregation plans and so-called "white flight" has been contested since
Coleman et al.'s 1975 study asserting a causal link. SeeJAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN
SEGREGATION 1968-73 76-80(1975) (cited in Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation:
Inpacts on Metropolitan Society 80 Minn. Law Rev. 825, 830 (1996)); see also Charles Vert
Willie & Michael Fultz, Comparative Analysis of Model School Desegregation Plans, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION PLANs THAT WORK, 197-213 (Charles Vert Willie 1984).
IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT WORK 163-173 (Charles Vert Willie ed.1984);
DAVID J. ARMOR, WHITE FLIGHT AND THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 187-226 (Walter G. Stephan and Joe R.
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Whatever the justification, it is undeniable that the objective of ra-
cial integration as a mechanism for enhancing the life opportunities
afforded to African Americans is, or ought to be, a social policy objective
requiring political decisions involving the allocation of public resources
and judgments as to what results could thereby be achieved. This is ex-
actly the kind of decision in respect of which politicians turn to the work
of social scientists, but it is not normally one within the purview of the
federal judge. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court appeared to require
federal judges to take on the task of implementing social policy objectives
for reasons which were not clear and in a manner which was not directly
articulated.29
In this Article, I explore the meaning of desegregation for both law-
yers and social scientists and its consequences for desegregation planning.
I argue that, whereas for social scientists desegregation was a process of
social change and required integration, for lawyers desegregation was a
remedy, its content shaped by the nature of the litigation process. That the
two conceptions of social science and law came together for a period of
twenty-five years or so following the Brown litigation should not divert
attention from the fundamental underlying differences containing within
themselves the basis for divergence and underpinning the reluctance of
current members of the Supreme Court to sanction race-conscious
remedies which are not directly linked to issues of constitutional fault.3
In Part One I outline the general argument by reference to what I
term the "underlying imperatives" of social science and law. By this I refer
to the values of social policy reform and remedial process that underpin
these respective disciplines and which determine the disciplinary bounda-
ries within which solutions legitimate to that discipline must be framed.
The disciplines of law and social science were brought together as a mat-
ter of conscious policy on the part of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),31 the organization formed in
Feagin eds. 1980). For a recent overview, see Christine Rossell, The Effectiveness of Desegre-
gation Plans, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21' CENTURY 67 (Christine H. Rossell et
al. eds., 2002). For the decline in numbers of white students in Boston public schools see
Robert A. Dentler, The Boston School Desegregation Plan in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS
THAT WORK 60-67 (Charles Vert Willie ed.1984) and ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B.
SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE BOSTON DESEGREGATION CASE 26
(1981).
29. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANrS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 18-19 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70 (1995)(Thomas,J., concur-
ring).
31. Technically, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Inc., later known as the LDF set
up as a separate organization headed by Thurgood Marshall in 1939, achieved financial
independence in 1957 and finally broke with the NAACP in 1978 following an unsuc-
cessfil lawsuit by the NAACP to compel the LDF to drop the NAACP initials from its
name. For a personal account see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL
BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 517-24 (2004). For a history of the NAACP
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1909 which became the nation's premier civil rights organization, largely
because it recognized and harnessed the power of litigation to initiate
social change. 2 Two issues relating to NAACP litigation strategy have
particular significance for the development of desegregation jurispru-
dence: the decision to litigate for integration as opposed to educational
equity and the strategic use of social science statements to lobby the US
Supreme Court.
In Part Two I consider the main contours of this strategic use by ref-
erence to four such statements. Sociologists Mark Chesler, Joseph Sanders
and Debra Kalmuss33 have drawn on the influential work of Harvard pro-
fessor Abram Chayes34 to argue that the effect of social science in schools
desegregation litigation has been the development of "new legal theory,"
in the course of which the remedial imperative may be said to have
moved from a "private law" conception of litigation as assertion of indi-
vidual rights in favor of a "public law" conception of litigation as
correction of social grievance.3 I consider whether social science concep-
tualizations of the harm of segregation and the benefits of integration can
be said to have influenced the Court's desegregation jurisprudence. I ar-
gue that, whereas some of the earlier decisions may be consistent with
such a view, in later years this is no longer the case. With the benefit of
hindsight I argue that the earlier cases represent the aberration and that,
with the disengagement cases of the 1990s, we see a reversion to a private
law model which probably never really went away and in respect of
which the capacity of social science to influence legal content is necessar-
ily circumscribed.36
and its involvement in school desegregation cases see MINNIE FINCH, THE NAACP: ITS
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (1981); LANGSTON HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE
NAACP (1962); CHARLES F. KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (The Johns Hopkins Press 1973) (1967). The
LDF played no part in the Boston case but NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel Jones
acted for the black plaintiffs in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), with
his successor Thomas Atkins taking over from Harvard Center for Law and Education
counsel Larry Johnson in the later stages of the litigation. For an account of the dispute
between attorneys Johnson and Atkins in the Morgan consent decree negotiations see
Marsha Murninghan, Court Disengagement in the Boston Public Schools: Towards a The-
ory of Restorative Law (1983)(unpublished Ed D. thesis, Harvard University)(on file with
Birmingham City University Library, Birmingham City University).
32. ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE
AND THE CONSTITUTION 51 (2003).
33. MARK. A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN
THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES (1988).
34. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
35. See CHESLER Er AL, supra note 33, at 27-61.
36. For the "disengagement cases," see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) and
Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70 (1995). See also discussion infra Part lI.C.
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I deal with the decision to press for integration as opposed to edu-
cational equity in Part Three when I return to this Article's opening
questions and consider the claim that Brown should have been decided
differently.
Whatever the impact of social science on the content of legal doc-
trine, in practical terms the remedial imperative inherent in the litigation
process required judges and social scientists to interact at the district court
level to construct a desegregation remedy.37 I return to the relationship
between social science and law in my conclusion. In the uncertain con-
tent of the term "desegregation" itself I identify a framework for analysis
that sees the court expert as fundamental to the process by which federal
district judges gave meaningful content on a pragmatic basis to the task of
desegregating the nation's schools.
I. LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SCHOOLS DESEGREGATION
Much has been written about the underlying ambiguities of the
Brown I reasoning and the difficulty of identifying a constitutional justifi-
cation for the decision. z In over-ruling the decision in Plessy39 which
underpinned the racial segregation laws of the South, the Supreme Court
made clear that, in the field of education, the doctrine of "separate but
equal" had no place40 but failed to make clear the nature of segregation's
harm. Although, as Professor Ronald Dworkin has suggested,41 the scope
for reliance in constitutional adjudication upon matters of empirical evi-
dence is necessarily limited, the reference in footnote 11 of Brown I to the
research of seven social scientists on the social and psychological effects of
segregation upon black children has inaugurated a debate about the im-
pact of social science which continues to characterize school selection
jurisprudence to this day.42 Since Brown I lawyers have continued to argue,
with varying degrees of success, that the federal judiciary should take no-
tice of social science research regarding the causes and consequences of
37. See infra Conclusion.
38. See Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case--Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971); see also Mark G. Yudof, School Desegrega-
tion: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 57 (1978);James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-out" School
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463 (1990); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAlv. L. REv. 1 (1959);Wilkinson, supra note 12.
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
40. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 294 at 495 (1955).
41. Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences
of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL SYMPOSIUM 19 (Ray C. Rist & Ronald J.Anson eds., 1976).
42. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 127
S, Ct. 2738 (2007) (discussed infra Part I.B).
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racial isolation and its impact upon the psychological and educational de-
velopment of African American children.43
The result has been the emergence of what Judge John Minor Wis-
dom has referred to as a "love match" between social science and law.44
Lawyers have relied upon social science research to substantiate claims of
constitutional harm and the effectiveness of the desired relief; social scien-
tists have provided the empirical bases upon which schools cases have
been fought. a Social scientists have addressed federal courts on matters
such as the changing demographic patterns of cities, the causes of "white
flight," the relationship between state policy, patterns of residence and the
racial identifiability of schools46 and the extent to which the under-
achievement of African American children constitutes a "lingering ves-
tige" of discrimination. 47 In this kind of litigation more than almost any
other, lawyers have looked to social science to translate issues of social fact
into constitutional issues and constitutional requirements into social
remedies.
As Charles T Clotfelter48 points out, however, it is important to bear
in mind that lawyers and social scientists have different conceptions of
what constitutes segregation and what the process of desegregation might
require. 49 In social science research, the term "segregation" is used de-
scriptively. Segregation occurs when black children are educated
separately from white children. In this sense, the terms "segregation" and
"racial isolation" are synonymous and integration is the appropriate social
policy response. 5 For lawyers, however, segregation refers to state-
mandated or sponsored discrimination on the grounds of race, accord-
ingly violating the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee. To
be successful, a plaintiff must establish an element of fault on the part of
the state or state actors and seek a remedy specifically tailored to respond
to harm that is a direct consequence of the constitutional violation."1 It is
43. See infra Part II.
44. John M. Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial
Decision-making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 LAw AND CONTIEMP. PROBS. 134,
142 (1975).
45. See discussion infra Part II.
46. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
47. Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
48. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AI'rE BROWN: THE RISE AND RErREAT OF SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION 201 (2004).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Justice O'Connor on equal protection analysis in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995)("All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests."). See also Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306,308-09 (2003).
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the legal emphasis on issues of causation that ties this branch of Equal
Protection jurisprudence to the empirical evidence afforded by social sci-
ence research.
A. The Differing Imperatives of Social Science and Law
Although the term does not appear in either case, desegregation fol-
lowing the Brown decisions came to represent the American commitment
to deliver on the promise of equal opportunity for all. The process of pub-
lic school reform brought together social scientists and lawyers with
different understandings of what the word meant and what the purpose
of the exercise might be. I argue here that these differences reflect the
fundamentally different imperatives of social science and law.
As education professor Diane Ravitch points out,52 the way in
which words are defined "is far more than a semantic exercise" but reflects
important underlying assumptions concerning values and policy goals.5
3
To that extent, the act of definition becomes in itself a statement of policy
with the capacity to have important strategic consequences. I argue that,
whereas both professionals speak in terms of desegregation as process, for
social scientists the underlying imperative is one of social change requir-
ing integration measured in terms of racial balance s4 and inter-racial
exposure. 5 The integration imperative is underpinned by what Armor has
termed the "harm-benefit thesis of social science," i.e. the thesis "that
school segregation is harmful and desegregation is beneficial to the edu-• ,56
cational and social outcomes of schooling. On this view, full integration
in terms of student population, faculty and educational programs, and also
of resource allocation, addresses the psychological and educational harm
of segregation and enables African American children to compete on an
equal footing not just in the classroom but also in terms of wider life op-
portunities. In social policy terms, integration was the way to respond to
the disparity between the condition of "the Negro"57 in American society
52. Diane Ravitch, Desegregation: Varieties of Meaning, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 31 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
53. Id.
54. This ties the racial mix of a school to that of its surrounding district within
specified permissible limits of deviation. See Armor, supra note 15, at 159 (noting that
what is important is the possibility of "meaningful interracial contact"); see also Clotfelter,
supra note 48, at 201.
55. This measures the extent to which white children and black children are able to
mix with each other in the same school or classroom. See Christine H. Rossell, The Effec-
tiveness of School Desegregation Plans, in ScHooL DESEGREGATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 75 (Christine H. Rossell et al. eds., 2002).
56. Armor, supra note 15, at 4.
57. I use this term self-consciously to reflect contemporary usage.
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and the American ideal of equal opportunity for all, which Gunnar Myr-
dal had identified as representative of the "American dilemma" ' 8
For lawyers, however, the process of desegregation is remedial and
governed by what are well-understood constraints concerning the nature
and limits of remedial relief. The underlying imperative is that of legiti-
macy, the need to keep within the proper compass of the law and of
judicial process that ultimately must tie judicial intervention to the reme-
dial process.
The judicial function in constitutional litigation is to declare the na-
ture and extent of constitutional rights and to provide a remedy that must
be tailored to the nature of the right. Attention to the requirement of le-
gitimacy in constitutional adjudication must also require a court to pay
due respect to the limitations that considerations of federalism and the
separation of powers place on the nature and extent of the judicial role,
issues I deal with elsewhere.59 In this Article, I refer primarily to those
aspects of legitimacy arising out of the nature of the remedial process
which can be expressed by reference to the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium
(Where there is a right there must be a remedy) .60The principle has two
related ideas: the existence of an actionable right which will usually re-
quire the identification of fault on the part of a defendant, and the
requirement for a remedy which must address the fault either by giving
effect to expectations which have been aroused or, more usually, by pro-
viding recompense or restitution in respect of loss which has been
sustained.6
In lawyers' terms, desegregation is a remedy for a constitutional vio-
lation. The action is usually couched in terms of the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which
provides that "no state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
58. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY xlvii (1944).
The ever-raging conflict between on the one hand, the valuations preserved
on the general plane which we shall call the "American creed," where the
American thinks, talks and acts under the influence of high national and
Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes
of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic,
social and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and con-
formity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of persons or
types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses and habits
dominate his outlook.
Id. at xii.
59. See Oakes, supra note 8.
60. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,163 (1803).
61. Id.
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the equal protection of the laws., 62 The question then is: what constitutes
the violation and what must be done for the purpose of affording relief?
In Brown I, the Court's declaration was clear but its reasoning am-
biguous. State-mandated separate provision of schooling for black and
white children must cease because a) separation offends the Constitution
per se;63 b) governmental discrimination by race causes psychological dam-
age to black children 64 and c) governmental discrimination by race
deprives black children of the educational benefits of mixing with white
children.6 ' Brown II directed federal courts to supervise the implementa-
tion of the remedial process but was similarly vague as to how this was to
be done.66 The Court invoked the exercise of equitable discretion but gave
little guidance to federal judges as to how that discretion was to be exer-
cised .
Since then the Court has attempted to provide remedial guidelines
that, at times, have been couched in the very widest terms. It has author-
ized desegregation plans for racial balance, compulsory busing,69
magnetic schools and programs' ° and even programs of educational en-
hancement,71 apparently on the basis that it shared the social science view
of the curative effects of racial integration although it has never made this
clear. The Court has, however, continued to assert, as it did in Swann, the
remedial imperative that "the nature of the violation determines the scope
of the remedy.' 72 In other words, the issue of fault as defined in legal
terms remains central to the definition of the remedy. Thus in the absence
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
63. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 294 at 495 (1955)(stating that "Sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
64. Id. at 494. "To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown
1, 347 U.S. at 494.
65. Id. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Okla.
State Regents for High Educ. Et al., 339 U.S. 637, 438 (1950)) (discussing the "intangible"
benefits for a law student of mixing with white students, i.e "his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students and, in general, to learn his profes-
sion.").
66. Brown v. Bd, of Educ. (Brown 1), 349 U.S. at 300 (1955).
67. Id.
68. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,23-25 (1971).
69. Id.
70. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins I1), 495 U.S. 33 (1990). "'Magnet schools' as gener-
ally understood, are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote
integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private schools
through distinctive curricula and high quality." Id. at 40.
71. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
72. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
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of fault, as the Court made clear in Swann" and again in Keyes,74 issues of
racial isolation or the under-performance of African American children
75are simply not the Court's concern.
In legal process of this kind it is, of course, the plaintiff who seeks
relief and the role of the court to that extent is passive; it either grants or
refuses to grant the relief sought. In this connection and with the benefit
of hindsight, the decision of the NAACP to abandon claims for "equal
education" and press for "racial integration" has been criticized . 76 Profes-
sor Derrick Bell goes so far as to offer an alternative response to Brown
which would have upheld the legality of Plessy, specifically for the pur-
pose of giving full effect to its premise of "equality.""7 I offer a brief
outline of NAACP strategy and deal with Bell's arguments below.
8
My argument in general terms is that, for a period of twenty-five
years or so following Brown, the social science imperative of integration
and the legal remedial imperative coincided in the identification of racial
balance or integration as the appropriate remedy for segregated schools.
Desegregation during this period meant integration, and integration
could justify race-conscious action. The coincidence was, however, tem-
porary and was undermined as demographic changes coupled with white
flight frustrated the attempt to integrate and cast doubt upon the assump-
tions that racial integration per se was a necessary aspect of equal
education. New questions were asked concerning the extent to which the
continuing academic under-achievement of African Americans should be
regarded as a "vestige" of discrimination sufficient to warrant the adoption
of affirmative action policies and the retention of court supervision. As
social scientists argued amongst themselves, the causal value of their re-
search in legal terms was correspondingly reduced. Reluctant to act on
the basis of an inconclusive "pedagogical sociology ' 9 and anxious to set
limits to the duration of the remedial process, the Rehnquist Court
turned to those other aspects of legitimacy, federalism (or states' rights)
and the separation of powers to justify federal court disengagement.80
73. Id. "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially or-
dering assignment of students on a racial basis." Id. at 28.
74. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
75. Id.
76. Notably by law professor and former NAACP counsel Derrick Bell. For an
overview of his contribution to the literature of so-called "Critical Race Scholarship" see
James R. Hackney Jr., Derrick Bell's Re-Sounding: WE.Du Bois, Modernisn and Critical Race
Scholarship, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 141 (1998).
77. BELL, supra note 29, at 20.
78. See infra Part l.B.
79. Jenkins By Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F 3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994)(Beam,J., dissent-
ing).
80. See infra Part II.D.
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The result was that the jurisprudence of schools desegregation re-
turned to the more familiar territory of the "color-blind Constitution"'8'
and the negative imperative of non-discrimination by reference to race.
8 2
No longer prepared to accept that integration per se constituted a legiti-
mate constitutional goal, the Court struck down affirmative action
policies unlinked to official segregative action."3 The re-appearance of ra-
cially-identifiable schools in a way that reflects demographic issues, as
opposed to intentional state discrimination, has been termed "resegrega-
tion" and the accusation made that the Court has betrayed the legacy of
Brown."'
B. Resegregation and Race-Conscious Policies
The issue of so-called resegregation perpetuates the dialogue be-
tween social science and law by posing new constitutional questions
about the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of integration."s In
cities where active court supervision of the desegregation process has
ceased, school boards which have voluntarily adopted race-conscious as-
signment policies or quotas have been challenged in the courts by white
students denied a place at over-subscribed schools on the grounds of their
race.8 6 The ensuing litigation once again raises the social policy questions
concerning the educational purpose of racial integration which were not
answered in Brown I: is integration a necessary ingredient of equal educa-
tion? Or conversely: what is the harm of racial isolation and how will
integration advance the educational opportunities of minority children?
81. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Parents Involved in Crnty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2782
(2007) (Thomas,J., concurring).
82. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond
v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
83. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469.
84. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD oF EDUCATION (1996); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVE-
NANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM
(2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education:
the Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
85. See infra Part II.
86. See McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F Supp. 1001 (D. Mass. 1996) (dis-
cussing Boston School Committee policy); see also Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 E 3d. 790 (1st
Cir.1998); Anderson v. City of Boston, 375 E3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004); Boston's Children First
v. Boston Sch. Comm. (BCF IV), 260 E Supp. 2d 318 (D. Mass. 2003); Boston's Children
First v. Boston Sch. Comm. (BCF II1), 183 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Mass. 2002); Boston's Chil-
dren First v. City of Boston (BCF I1), 98 F Supp. 2d 111 (D. Mass. 2000); Boston's
Children First v. City of Boston (BCF 1), 62 F Supp. 2d 247 (D. Mass. 1999).
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II. LOBBYING THE SUPREME COURT: THE "HARM-BENEFIT THESIS"
AS LITIGATION STRATEGY
The two affirmative action cases from Seattle and Kentucky that
have recently come before the Supreme Court represent the latest attempt
in the endeavor to link social science research with constitutional or legal
imperative.87 The court was asked to test the issue of constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions policies by reference to the harm prevented
and the goal achieved. 88 The school boards argued that racial balance is
necessary in order to enhance the educational opportunities of African
American children.89 The white parents' groups, the petitioners in these
cases, opposed this on the grounds of unconstitutional racial preference.0
At issue, once again, was the alleged "harm" of racial isolation and the
educational benefits of integration. The court was asked to consider ex-
actly what the constitutional relationship was between racial integration
and the equal opportunities of African American children. 91
As has become typical in schools cases, the litigation set expert
against expert. The school authorities' argument that race-conscious poli-
cies promote educational benefit was supported by an amicus curiae brief
submitted by 553 social scientists who testified to the educational benefits
of racially integrated schools and the harmful educational implications of
racial isolation- In a rival brief for the plaintiffs, social scientist and de-
segregation expert Armor together with the academics Thernstrom and
Thernstrom critically reviewed the research in the field, concluding that
evidence of either a short-term or a long-term benefit of integration is
simply lacking. 3 There is, in their view, "no evidence of a clear and con-
sistent relationship either between desegregation and academic
achievement" or "between desegregation and such long-term outcomes as
college attendance, occupational status, and wages ... In terms of social
outcomes such as "racial attitudes, prejudice, race relations and inter-racial
87. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007).
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2746.
91. Id.
92. Brief for 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1-2,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-
908,05-915).
93. Brief for David J. Armor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Par-
ents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-
908,05-915).
94. Id.
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contact" they suggest that the impact of racial balancing policies on white
students is likely to be negative.9'
The Seattle and Kentucky brief represented the fifth in a series of
statements submitted to the Supreme Court in schools cases, starting with
Brown I where Earl Warren's footnoted reference to the work of social
scientists began a debate concerning the influence of social science on
Supreme Court jurisprudence in school desegregation cases.96
A. The Topeka Brief and the Harm of Segregation
The NAACP argument as set out in the Appellate Brief submitted
to the Supreme Court on behalf of the Plaintiffh made two assertions
claimed to represent the consensus of social scientists: 1) Distinctions or
classifications based upon race or color reflect a myth of Negro inferiority
which has no basis in fact, and 2) State-enforced segregation harms the
psychological development of African American children who interpret
separation as connoting inferiority and are deprived of the benefits of an
integrated education. 97
Attached to the brief in the form of an appendix was a social sci-
ence statement with 32 signatories who claimed to be "some of the
foremost authorities in the area of American race relations,"" representing
a spectrum of expertise from sociology and anthropology to psychology
and psychiatry.
The decision of NAACP lawyers to use social science to mount a
direct attack on the constitutionality of segregated education has been
well-documented. 9  The so-called "Jim Crow" laws'00 of the South were
legitimated by the Supreme Court decision in Plessy'0 ' which held that
95. Id.
96. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 11 (1954).
97. Brief for Appellants at 5, Oliver Brown, et al., Appellants, v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, KS et al., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (No. 1).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., HERBERT HILL &JACK GREENBERG, CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DESEGREGATION:
A STUDY OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1955); kicHaRD KLUGER, SIM-
PLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 555-557 (1975)(describing fissures within NAACP over the use
of social science data); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE-
GATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987)(describing early stages of litigation that led to the
1954 decision in Broun);JuAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
197-205 (1998)(describing NAACP's decision to submit psychologist Kenneth Clark's
"doll study" as evidence of segregation's harmful effect on black children); Louis Menand,
Civil Actions: Brown v. Board of Education and the Limits of Law, NEW YORKER, Feb. 12 2001,
at 91.
100. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2001)(classic
account of these state laws).
101. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 544 (1895).
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separate facilities for blacks were not inherently objectionable: "laws per-
mitting, and even requiring, [racial] separation ... do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other."'' 2 Moreover, the Court
held that while the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to en-
force equality before the law, "it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as opposed to political
equality.' 0 3 Enforced racial separation connotes black inferiority only be-
cause "the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."'0 4
Early NAACP challenges had had some success in requiring states
to eliminate substantial disparities in the provision of facilities and educa-
tional opportunities, but left intact the racist assumptions upon which
Plessy rested.'0' Under the leadership of Thurgood Marshall, NAACP law-
yers worked with social scientists to develop a strategy which would
disrupt these assumptions by demonstrating a) that the biology of race
and racial inferiority was unsound, b) that the causes of racial inequality
were social and economic, and c) that segregative practices reflecting sci-
entifically unsound assumptions reinforced the psychological perceptions
of young black children concerning their own inferiority and so operated
as a structure of subordination.'
0 6
The "sociological argument" that they developed drew heavily upon
the work of sociologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark, whose "doll
studies" indicated the negative effects of racism on young children, 7 and
Gunnar Myrdal, whose American Dilemma (1944) had done much to fa-
miliarize the American public with sociological arguments concerning
the connection between race and social oppression.' ° In sociological
terms, the argument went, equalization of resources and materials in a
dual system would not of itself provide black children with an equal edu-
cation because black schools, however well-resourced, would continue to
102. Id. at 544.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Gaines court
believed that the "separate but equal" doctrine rested "wholly upon the equality of the
privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within the State." Id. at 349. Mis-
souri's failure to provide a law school for blacks constituted a manifest denial of equal
protection, even though the State offered the black applicant a scholarship to attend a law
school in an adjoining State. Id. at 345. "The basic consideration is not as to what sort of
opportunities other States provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as
to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to negroes
solely upon the ground of color." Id. at 349.
106. See sources cited supra note 99.
107. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie K. Clark, Segregation as a Factor in the Racial
Identification of Negro Pre-school Children: A Preliminary Report, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL ED. 161
(1939). For further discussion see COTrROL Er AL., supra note 32, at 124. See also Kluger,
supra note 99.
108. Myrdal, supra note 58.
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be regarded as inferior.' ° Calculation of the "harm" of segregation was
more than a matter of resources; the intangible social and economic con-
sequences rendered a dual system inherently discriminatory.
The Topeka arguments were trialed in two cases (Sweatt and McLau-
rin"0 ) which preceded the Brown litigation and reached the Supreme
Court in 1950. NAACP lawyers assembled expert testimony from social
scientists, sociologists, psychologists and educators, all testifying to the po-
tential of segregation to cause psychological harm.'11 The novelty of the
approach was recognized in the opening words of the Sweatt Petitioner's
Brief:
This case is believed to present for the first time in this Court
a record in which the issue of the validity of a state constitu-
tional or statutory provision requiring the separation of the
races in professional schools is clearly raised. It is the first re-
cord which contains expert testimony and other convincing
evidence showing the lack of any reasonable basis for racial
112segregation....
The argument had some success. Both Sweatt and McLaurin were
"equalization" cases and the Court was not required to address directly
the constitutionality of Plessy.113 Nevertheless, by emphasizing the impor-
tance of "intangible" benefits as an aspect of equality, the Court signaled
its receptiveness to the sociological argument. In Sweatt, where a black
applicant was denied access to the University of Texas Law School, the
court referred to qualities "which are incapable of objective measurement
but which make for greatness in a law school", and included matters such
as "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige", as aspects of equal educational opportunity.14 In McLaurin,
ChiefJustice Vinson for the Court laid particular emphasis upon the need
for black students to mix with their white counterparts."5 Thus when
109. See sources cited supra note 99.
110. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637,
641 (1950).
111. See Kluger, supra note 99, at 256 (discussing the trial court evidence). In Sweatt v.
Painter, the court received evidence on the psychological effects of segregation from
Robert Redfield, Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago.
An amicus brief submitted on behalf of a group of 187 law professors (The Committee of
Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education) made the argument that racial seg-
regation was unconstitutional per se. See Kluger, supra note 99, at 275; see also Tushnet, supra
note 99, at 70, 82, 105.
112. Petition forWrit of Certiorari, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)(No. 2).
113. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950).
114. Id. at 634.
115. McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). "Our society grows increas-
ingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case
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shortly afterwards the NAACP Board of Directors announced its resolu-
tion to seek desegregation in all future education cases, the structure of
the arguments which were later deployed in Brown I was largely in
place.1
1 6
Whether the decision of the Supreme Court was thereby influenced
is a matter of some debate." 7 The words of ChiefJustice Warren are well-
known: "to separate [children] from others of a similar age and qualifica-
tions solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone."" 8 His quotation of the lower court " 9
and the famous footnote eleven which referenced the work of seven so-
cial scientists12 0 to support his rejection of Plessy invited an affirmative
conclusion from which he himself subsequently backtracked' 2' and which
represents the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in
education, to become, by definition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come
under his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives.
Their own education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his train-
ing is unequal to that of his classmates. State imposed restrictions which produce such
inequalities cannot be sustained." Id.
116. In July 1950 following a conference of lawyers convened by Marshall to "map
. . the legal machinery for an all-out attack" on segregation. See Tushnet, supra note 99, at
136.
117. See Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science
and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STA'. L. REV. 793 (2002).
118. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
119.
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually inter-
preted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority
affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental devel-
opment of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system".
Id.
120. Id. at 495, FN11. (citing Kenneth B. Clark, ADDRESS AT THE MID-CENTURY
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOuTH: THE EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950); PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING
(Helen Leland Witmer & Ruth Kotinsky eds., 1952); Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The
Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.PSYCHOL.
259 (1948); Isidor Chein, Mhat are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of
Equal Facilities?, 3 INT'L.J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); THEODORE BRAMELD,
EDUCATIONAL COSTS IN DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44-48 (Maclver ed.,
1949); FRANKLIN E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-681 (1949); and
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERIcAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOC-
RACY (1949)).
121. Kluger, supra note 99, at 706 (stating "it was only a footnote, after all.").
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has garnered opposition from both contemporary and subsequent aca-
demic commentators.122
As Dworkin and others have commented, the task of constitutional
adjudication is a search for values that should not depend on matters of
empirical research, particularly when researchers themselves do not
agree. 2 3 The validity of the "doll studies" upon which the Topeka brief
had drawn was itself challenged more or less immediately by subsequent
researchers,1 24 while the Coleman Report of 1966 sponsored by the U.S.
Office of Education failed to find either the expected resource dispari-
ties between black schools and white schools or a discernible
relationship between distribution of resources and academic achieve-
ment.125 Its conclusion, that the major causes of under-achievement of
both blacks and whites lay not in segregation but in the socio-economic
class of their parents, undermined the harm-benefit thesis which pro-
duced the Topeka argument and brought about a split in the social science
community.2 6 In the years that followed, social scientists were no longer
necessarily prepared to testify that racial separation constituted a denial of
127
equal educational opportunity.
Nevertheless, the Topeka statement set a strategic precedent that was
followed in the years after Brown as the focus of desegregation moved to
the north where there was no overtly discriminatory legislation. Here the
NAACP needed social scientists to establish the causal connections be-
tween official policy and school and faculty composition required for a
finding of constitutional violation.
122. See Mody, supra note 117 (discussing the literature).
123. See Dworkin, supra note 41, at 24; see also Edmond Cahn, A Dangerous Myth in
the School Desegregation Cases, 30 N.YU. L. Rev. 150, 157-58 (1955)("[1] would not have
the constitutional rights of Negroes-or of other Americans-rest on any such flimsy
foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in these records"); Herbert Wechsler,
Towvards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
124. See Roy L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES
70 (3rd ed. Carolina Academic Press 2005) (1950) (discussing research critical of the "doll
studies"). The "doll studies" conducted by Professor Kenneth Clark and his wife and fel-
low psychologist Mamie, claimed that black children in New York when given a choice of
playing with a black or white doll showed a clear preference for the white doll. When
asked to draw "the nice doll" the children again opted for the white. The Clarks drew the
conclusion that black children in a segregated school system suffered from a sense of self-
rejection and a loss of self-worth. See generally Kluger, supra note 106, at 317-18.
125. Armor, supra note 15, at 66. (discussing James.S Coleman et al., Equality of Edu-
cational Opportunity (1966)).
126. Professor Coleman himself refused to testify from this data in support of deseg-
regation. See Chesler et al., supra note 33, at 41-43.
127. Id.
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B. Social Science and Desegregating the North: The Columbus Brief and
"The Web of Institutional Discriminations"
The hope that the Supreme Court would extend recognition of the
social science harm-benefit thesis to the schools of the North, where ra-
cial identifiability reflected the heavy concentrations of the black urban
population rather than state-mandated racial separation, evaporated after
the Court ruled in Keyes that defacto segregation was not a constitutional
violation per se.128 Chesler et al. describe Keyes as "the last nail in the coffin
of the harm theory of northern school desegregation!'" 29 Although, as
Justice Powell pointed out, social science research confirmed that segrega-
tion in biracial metropolitan areas is largely a function of residential
patterns, 30 the Supreme Court majority was not prepared to accept that
racial separation per se offended the Constitution.13 1 What was required
was an officially mandated or produced dual system, involving proof of
two things: segregative purpose causing segregative effect.' 32 Causal analy-
sis assumed central importance in northern schools desegregation
jurisprudence: "where Plaintiffs proved that the school authorities had
carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial
portion of the students, schools, teachers and facilities within the school
system, it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a predicate
for a finding of a dual school system.'' 33 Following the Detroit schools
case'34 which was the immediate predecessor for the Boston case, social
science testimony on the causes and effects of racial separation and par-
ticularly the interrelationship between schools and their surrounding
neighborhoods became a standard feature of NAACP-LDF litigation
128. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S 189,208 (1973).
129. Chesler et al., supra note 33, at 46.
130. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)("[T]he familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas
of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns
the impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and
rarely ameliorated by action of public school authorities. This is a national, not a southern,
phenomenon. And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular State had or did not have
segregative school laws.").
131. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205.
132. Id. at 205, 208 (stating that "the essential elements of dejure segregation [are]
stated simply, a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action ...
"[w]e emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate."). See also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229,240 (1976).
133. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
134. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971) was decided at the dis-
trict court level on September 27, 1971. It reached the U.S. Supreme Court for the first
time in 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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strategy, not simply in relation to issues of liability but also to support a
claim for a system-wide remedy.1
3
5
The Keyes court had been generous in one respect: the Court held
that a finding of intentional discrimination in one part of the school sys-
tem gave rise to a presumption that the discrimination is system wide,
shifting the burden to the school authorities to prove that segregated
schools were not "the result of intentionally segregative acts.!' 36 However,
when the Detroit case reached the Supreme Court in 1974, causal analysis
moved centre-stage as the Court refused a metropolitan solution to a
city-district problem. 37 The plan, which involved busing from the (black)
city to the (White) suburbs, was not acceptable because the out-of-district
suburbs were not implicated in the urban-district violation. A remedy
which involved desegregation across district lines was only permissible
where the plaintiffs could show "a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.'
39
Two cases from Ohio in which the Court was asked to sanction sys-
tem-wide remedial plans were the occasion for the second social science
statement submitted to the Supreme Court."O In Dayton I the court,
while emphasizing the importance of tying relief to acts of discrimination,
was prepared to recognize the existence of an "incremental segregative
effect" which might justify a system-wide remedy.4 ' When Dayton II and
Columbus43 reached the Supreme Court on the remedy issue, the Social
Science Statement attached as an appendix to the Columbus Respondents'
Brie' 43 had 38 signatories, whose background was not psychology or so-
cial psychology as in Brown, but who were primarily identifiable as
sociologists, or political or educational scientists. 44The purpose was to
135. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
136. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S 189, 208 (1973).
137. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I1), 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
141. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Rhenquist stated that "[When a constitutional violation has been found] the
District Court [...] must determine how much incremental segregative effect these viola-
tions had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently
constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence
of such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference,
and only if there has been a system wide impact may there be a system wide remedy." Id.
at 420 (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. 526 (1979)).
142. Dayton 1I, 443 U.S. 526; Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
143. Brief for Respondents, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979)(No. 78-610).
144. See Chesler et al., supra note 33, at 25. The list of signatories included Robert A.
Dentler.
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lend support to the NAACP claim for a system-wide remedy by asserting
the cumulative effect of a "web of institutional discriminations" as the
basic cause of school and residential segregation.' 4'The statement recast
the "harm-benefit" thesis into three basic claims: 1) that patterns of resi-
dential segregation were attributable to the actions of public authorities,
including school boards; 2) that the relationship between school segrega-
tion and residential segregation was interdependent, and 3) that
neighborhood school policies and attendance zones which produce ra-
cially identifiable schools can and do contribute to residential segregation
and thus can be regarded as discriminatory. 46 In a section headed "Con-
clusions Social Science Can and Cannot Supply," the social scientists set
out two important caveats: 1) the cumulative effect for which they were
arguing was not susceptible to a "but for" test (i.e. would the segregation
have occurred "but for" the discriminatory acts complained of),' and 2)
there was an absence of consensus about matters such as the. terms of the
debate, the appropriate measurement techniques and theoretical formula-
tions and the trustworthiness of empirical results.'4 '
The assertion of "an emerging consensus" concerning a preference
for system-wide rehef was apparently enough for the Dayton II and Co-
lumbus majorities '49 (there is no direct or indirect reference to the
statement in the majority opinion in either case), but not for Justice
Rehnquist whose criticism of the district court's "cavalier approach to
causality and purpose" continued to emphasize the importance of a "but
for" approach to issues of violation and remedy.'s Thus awareness of a
likely segregative effect should not be regarded as intentional discrimina-
tion, and remedies must be tailored to the violation. In his view "the
fundamental mission of [desegregation] remedies is to restore those inte-
grated educational opportunities that would now exist but for
purposefully discriminatory school board conduct."' '
145. Brief for Respondents, supra note 148,Appendix at 13a.
146. See id. at 3a, 7a, IOa-14a.
147. Id. at 18a. The brief argues: "[s]ocial scientists cannot answer such questions with
precision. The questions can be rephrased to call for stating what the present would be like
if the past had differed in certain specified respects. This is reminiscent of the grand 'what
if' games of history [ ... ] The present state of empirical knowledge and models of social
change does not permit precise specification of the effects of removing particular historical
actions. Although many of the causes of segregated outcomes are known, this knowledge is
not so thoroughly quantified as to permit precise estimates of the effects of specific dis-
criminatory acts on general patterns of segregation." Id. at 19a.
148. Id. at 25a.
149. Id. Research indicated that system-wide desegregation plans which minimize
the possibility of "white-flight" were more successful at establishing stability in student
enrolments and thus more likely to succeed than plans which were limited "to the imme-
diate vicinity of a ghetto or barrio." Id. at 25a-26a.
150. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,515 (1979).
151. Id. at 524 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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C. The Harm-Benefit Thesis and Unitary Status:
The Freeman and Jenkins Briefs
The inability of social science to provide precise answers to ques-
tions concerning the exact relationship between specific discriminatory
acts and their alleged lingering effects significantly limited the utility of
the "harm-benefit" thesis in the termination cases of the 1990s. In Brown
II the Court directed school boards "to effectuate a transition to a racially
non-discriminatory school system" and directed district judges to main-
tain jurisdiction during the transition.12 The Green Court recast the goal
of desegregation in terms of "unitary status": "the transition to a unitary
non-racial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be
brought about."'' 3 In the case of Board of Education v. Dowell,' the Court
required a two-part inquiry for unitary status and federal court with-
drawal: 1) had the school district complied in good faith with the court
order, and 2) had the vestiges of past discrimination been eliminated "to
the extent practicable"?' 5 In considering the latter point, the District
Court should consider not only student assignments but "every facet of
school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities
and facilities.'1 6 The question in Freeman was whether the District Court
could relinquish jurisdiction incrementally even though full compliance
with a desegregation order might not have been achieved.
157
The Social Science Statement submitted by way of an amicus brie e
58
in support of continuing jurisdiction re-articulated the "harm-benefit
thesis" in terms of the benefits of desegregation: "desegregation is gener-
ally associated with moderate gains in the achievement of black students
and the achievement of white students is typically unaffected.""19 "Its
benefits extend beyond the classroom to the larger issues of integration in
employment, higher education, and housing."60 It acknowledged the asso-
ciation with "white flight" but asserted that the relationship between
school segregation and residential segregation is reflexive; desegregated
schools can influence housing choice, and desegregation plans, including
152. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
153. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,436 (1968).
154. Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
155. Id. at 249,250.
156. Id. at 250 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435).
157. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,471 (1992).
158. Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1991) (No. 89-1290). See generally Armor, supra note 15, 71-76.
159. Brief for NAACP et al. , as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
162, at 51 (quoting Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie, The Contribution of School De-
segregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integration in Eliminating Racism:
Profiles in Controversy 284-285 (Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A.Taylor eds. 1988)).
160. Id. at 58.
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extensive court-ordered plans, can foster long-lasting demographic stabil-
S161ity. At its best, it concluded, desegregation is not simply a process of
placing black and white children together in a school but is a matter of
developing techniques, including those of educational innovation that will
further the goals of racial integration.
16
1
However, as Armor suggests, the acknowledgement that effective de-
segregation is dependent upon certain conditions, without which the
promised benefits will not necessarily be delivered, weakened the impact
and deprived the "harm-benefit" thesis of some of its moral authority.63
Upholding the power of the District Court to withdraw from supervision
incrementally, the Supreme Court was not to be deflected from strict
causal analysis. 64 In a rare unanimous decision, the Court affirmed what it
said was implicit in its earlier ruling in Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler6':
"racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued
when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation."'
66
Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion noted the difficulties of attributing
the existence of racially imbalanced schools to constitutional violations
"dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President or earlier.
' 67
The inclination of the Court to move its jurisprudence to a post-
desegregation climate was the occasion for the fourth social science
statement to be submitted to the Court, this time in a case that consid-
ered the harm-benefit thesis in terms of educational under-achievement.
In Jenkins III, the issue was whether the State of Missouri should be re-
quired to continue to fund quality education programs established to
compensate for the reduction in achievement levels of minority children
attributable to prior de jure segregation. 16 The Milliken II Court had ac-
cepted the argument that the harms of unconstitutional segregation could
include educational harm as well as racial isolation.69 The remedial plan
ordered into effect in Missouri had been described as the most ambitious
and expensive remedial program in the history of school desegregation.
70
161. Id. at 44-50.
162. Id. at 72-73.
163. Armor, supra note 15, at 73.
164. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
165. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In Spangler the Court
held that once a unitary system had been achieved there was no duty to maintain racial
balance where the imbalance was the result of demographic forces rather than constitu-
tional violation. Id. at 435-37.
166. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.
167. Id. at 506 (Scalia,J., concurring). See also id. at 503 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("Ra-
cially imbalanced schools are hence the product of a blend of public and private actions
and any assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in
the absence of a particular one of these factors is guesswork.").
168. Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70, 74-80 (1995).
169. Milliken v. Bradley (Millken Ii), 433 U.S. 267,287-288 (1977).
170. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 78.
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The total cost for the quality education programs alone exceeded $220
million) 7' The class plaintiffs now opposed a partial termination order,
arguing that the fact that student achievement levels as measured by an-
nual standardized tests were still "at or below national norms at many
grade levels" constituted a vestige of discrimination which had yet to be
fully eliminated.
172
Submitted as an appendix to a Social Science aricus brief and enti-
tled Educational Remedies for School Segregation: A Social Science Statement,
the purpose of the statement was to caution against application of a crude
causal analysis in relation to the vestiges of segregation. '73 The docu-
mented under-achievement of minority children, it argued, reflects a
culture of low expectations on the part of teachers and students alike and
is associated with the high concentration of economic poverty in urban
school districts. Both of these factors have their origins in decades of ra-
cial segregation and continue to affect behavior and achievement patterns
long after the unconstitutional discriminatory practices have ceased.174 To
be effective, the scientists argued, remedial programs need to be long term
and the educational components should be rigorously monitored and
evaluated by recognized indicators which include standardized testing of
student outcomes.175
D. Does the Court Take Note? The Harm-Benefit Thesis
and a Public Law Remedial Model
The extent to which desegregation jurisprudence at the Supreme
Court level has, or indeed should, take account of social science has gen-
erated considerable debate.17 6 Apart from Footnote Eleven in Brown it is
difficult to identify any clear evidence that social science submissions have
had a direct impact on the jurisprudence of the Court. 177 However, as
Professor James Ryan points out, in. a political climate supportive of the
goal of integration, the Court was apparently prepared to accept the re-
medial benefits of integration for minority students more or less without
171. Id. at 76.
172. Id. at 72.
173. Brief of Anderson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)(No. 93-1823), reprinted in Mark A. Smylie et al., Educational
Remedies for School Segregation: A Social Science Statement to the US. Supreme Court in Missouri
v.Jenkins, 27 Urb. Rev. 207(1995).
174. Smylie, supra note 173, at 212.
175. Id. at 220-24.
176. For a recent review of the literature regarding Brown see Mody, supra note 117.
For a recent discussion of later case law see James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social
Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1659 (2003).
177. Ryan, supra note 176.
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question."' Indeed, the relaxed approach to issues of causation evident in
the presumptions of Green,'79 Swann,"'s and Keyes 8" more or less assumes
the "web of institutional discriminations" which the later Columbus so-
cial science statement argued made education a "pervasive governmentally
organized activity."'82
There is, however, no doubt that in the termination cases of the
1990s the Court accorded higher priority to disengagement than to social
science-based arguments concerning the continuing harms of segregation.
In Dowell the Court upheld a finding of unitary status even though, as the
dissent pointed out, the conditions likely to inflict the "stigmatic injury
condemned in Brown I" persisted and there remained "feasible methods of
eliminating such conditions.1 83 In Freeman,14 the Court sanctioned partial
and incremental withdrawal from desegregation supervision and in Jenkins
III it permitted termination of remedial programs which had been in
place for seven years on the basis, despite the findings of the district judge
to the contrary, that "white flight" and the continuing disparities between
the achievements of minority and majority students must be attributable
to "external factors, beyond the control of the [school committee] and the
State."' 85 The Social Science statement was more or less ignored. Justice
Thomas, concurring, was overtly dismissive of the value of social science
evidence generally in schools cases: "[T]he judiciary is fully competent to
make independent determinations concerning the existence of state [dis-
178. Id. at 1666.
179. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
180. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
181. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
182. Brief for Respondents at 7a, 13a, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449
(1979)(No. 78-610). See also Green, 391 U.S. 430; Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (establishing the
presumption that any present segregation is the result of prior acts of segregation); Keyes,
413 U.S. at 208 (establishing the presumption that a finding of intentional acts of discrimi-
nation in one part of a school district warranted a presumption that other parts of the
district were similarly affected).
183. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 252 (1991).(Marshall,J., dissenting).
184. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
185. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins I11), 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995). The trial court had
specifically found that de jure segregation "caused a system-wide reduction in student
achievement" in the Kansas City, MO schools and developed a remedial plan. Jenkins v.
Missouri, 639 F Supp. 19, 24 (WD.Mo.), aft'd Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F2d 657 (8th Cir.
1986). The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's later decision denying the school
district's motion for a finding of unitary status. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F3d 393, 404
(8th Cir. 1994). Dissenting from the denial of a request for rehearing en banc and object-
ing to the district court's establishment of a student achievement goal gauged by results
from standardized tests, Judge Beam wrote "in my view, this case as it now proceeds, in-
volves an exercise in pedagogical sociology not constitutional adjudication." Id. at 404
(Beam,J. dissenting). The Supreme Court ordered the district court to "sharply limit, if not
dispense with, its reliance on" student achievement as measured by test scores.Jenkins III,
515 US. at 101.
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criminatory] action without the unnecessary ... assistance of the social
sciences.' '1s6 Lower courts "should not be swayed by the easy answers of
social science, nor should they accept the findings and the assumptions of
sociology and psychology at the expense of constitutional principle.,
18 7
The Civil Rights Project has these remarks in mind when it attributes the
decline in the momentum of desegregation to changes in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. "Since the Supreme Court changed desegregation law in
three major decisions between 1991 and 95, the momentum of desegre-
gation for black students has clearly reversed in the South, where the
movement had by far its greatest success." In consequence, it charges, fed-
eral courts have changed from being "on the leading edge" of
desegregation activity to become "its greatest obstacle."
18 8
186. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 121 (Thomas,J., concurring).
187. Id. at 122-23.
188. Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Los-
ing the Dream? 5-6 (2003), Available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf. See, e.g, Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski
County, 237 E Supp. 2d. 988 (E.D. Ark. 2002)(for Jenkins-induced skepticism regarding
social science testimony in termination cases); see also Davis v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 95 F
Supp. 2d. 688,697 (E.D. Mich. 2000)(dismissing social science information).
In Pulaski the district court, holding that plaintiffs had not come forward with evi-
dence to attribute the achievement gap to unconstitutional conduct of the school board,
commented:
Sociologists and educators have recognized for over a decade that there are a
host of factors, completely unrelated to the effects of de jure segregation, that
also are responsible for the minority student achievement gap. Some of these
other factors include low birth weight, poverty, whether the student is raised
by a single parent, parental interest and involvement, and peer influence.
Complicating this issue still further is the fact that the achievement gap "ex-
ists across the country in prior segregated school districts and school districts
that have not discriminated against minority students."
237 E Supp.2d. at 1037 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F Supp. 1151, 1158-64 (WD.
Mo. 1997)).
The court continued,
How does a trial court go about determining, with any degree of precision,
the percentage of the achievement gap (assuming there is any) that is causally
related to de jure segregation (which ended many decades earlier)-after some-
how excluding the host of other socioeconomic factors that are universally
recognized as also contributing to the achievement gap? Reviewing the re-
ported cases in which brave souls have undertaken this task puts one in mind
of trying to nail jelly to a wall."
Id.
In Davis the court was dismissive of the information value of social science evi-
dence:
Even now, with the perspective of almost three decades, historians, sociolo-
gists and legal scholars vigorously disagree over the socio-economic,
demographic and educational impact busing has had on our communities. As
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Chesler et al.189 have suggested that school desegregation remedial
jurisprudence evidences a tension between two models of adjudication
described in Chayes' much-cited article published in 1976.' 90 Chayes ar-
gued that the traditional conception of the civil lawsuit as a vehicle for
settling disputes between private individuals about private rights does not
fit class action suits in constitutional matters which are primarily con-
cerned with grievances about the operation of public policy1 91 In the
traditional conception, the "private law model," the focus of judicial in-
quiry is on issues of intent (intentional infringement of plaintiffs' rights)
and the remedial purpose is restitution or compensation.1 9 2 The orienta-
tion is retrospective; the court asks "what are the consequences for the
parties of specific past instances of conduct?" and tailors relief to remedy
those consequences. In the school desegregation class action, however,
issues of intent lose their centrality and the orientation of inquiry be-
comes essentially forward-looking. The relief sought is usually injunctive,
and fashioned by reference to the likely consequences of policy imple-
mentation and official behavior. 193 The consequence is that in a public law
model, remedial outcomes depend upon a process of fact-evaluation more
akin to legislative than judicial process as traditionally conceived:
The whole process begins to look like the traditional descrip-
tion of legislation: Attention is drawn to a "mischief," existing
or threatened, and the activity of the parties and court is di-
rected to the development of on-going measures designed to
cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is often the case, the decree
sets up an affirmative regime governing the activities in con-
troversy for the indefinite future and having binding force for
persons within its ambit, then it is not very much of a stretch
to see it as, pro tanto, a legislative act. 194
in so many areas of debate, current perspectives on the impact of busing ap-
pear divided along the lines of the old adage, "Where you come in is where
you go out."
Davis, 95 F Supp.2d. at 695.
Accord Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F 3d. 790, 804 (1st Cir.1998) (finding that a post-
termination race-conscious admissions policy for the Boston Latin schools was not justi-
fied by the prior history of dejure segregation, and criticizing the experts' testimony: "we
do not propose that the achievement gap bears no relation to some form of prior dis-
crimination. We posit only that it is fallacious to maintain that an endless gaze at any set of
raw numbers permits a court to arrive at a valid etiology of complex social phenomena.").
189. CHESLER, supra note 33.
190. CHAYEs, supra note 34.
191. Id. at 1302.
192. Id. at 1285.
193. The court is asked "to enjoin future or threatened action, or to modify a course
of conduct presently in train or a condition presently existing." Id. at 1296.
194. Id. at 1297.
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E. Pedagogical Sociology and Judicial Activism:
The Search for Legitimacy
Brown II required the federal judiciary to step outside a traditional
role of adjudication and assume responsibility for tasks of management
and supervision. The widespread expansion of the process described by
Chayes 9' into fields such as prisons, housing and mental health, under-
pinned by a widespread cynicism verging on nihilism concerning the
autonomous nature of legal reasoning, has generated what Professor Mark
Yudof has described as a "crisis of legitimacy" in relation to judicial activ-
ity. In this context, the attraction of social science evidence is its
capacity to defuse arguments concerning the irrational nature of judicial
reasoning; if processes of legal reasoning could not themselves be de-
scribed as "scientific," they could at least claim to be of social benefit, as
determined by the objective processes of"scientific" disciplines.
1 97
In desegregation litigation, the submission of sociological informa-
tion and data for the judge's information became unremarkable to the
point of routine; yet, as Cahn 9" points out, the so-called Brandeis brief, 99
when used as a strategy of attack, is a two-edged sword. °00 In an adversar-
ial process, "shrewd, resourceful lawyers can put a Brandeis brief together
in support of almost any conceivable exercise of legislative judgment''
01
The politicization of social science research in schools desegregation cases
did much to undermine faith in its claims of objectivity and maturity and
engendered a growing perception of a crisis of legitimacy on the part of
the social sciences themselves.2' The dissent's dismissal of "pedagogical
sociology" in Jenkins III articulates the growing mistrust on the part of the
195. Chayes, supra note 34.
196. Yudof, supra note 38, at 67.
197. Id.
198. Edmond Cahn,Jurisprudence, 30 N.YU. L. REV. 150, 154 (1955).
199. Louis D. BRANDEIS, ASSISTED BY JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY:
DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN CURT MULLER VS. STATE OF OREGON:
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OREGON TEN HOUR LAW FOR WOMEN AND
BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF OREGON (1908), available at http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/
ww/organizations-ncl.php. The brief was filed by future Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and argued the need for special pro-
tection for women on health and safety grounds in support of an Oregon statute that
purported to restrict women's working hours. The Brandeis brief contained two pages of
legal argument accompanied by approximately 100 pages of sociological and economic
data. The style was replicated in the NAACP's brief in Brown I. See generally PAUL L. ROSEN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 75-101,134-172(1972).
200. See Cahn, supra note 198, at 154.
201. Id. at 154. See generally ROSEN, supra note 199, at 75.
202. Yudof, supra note 38, at 71.
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judiciary concerning the value of testimony from the "soft sciences" in
203constitutional matters.
Chesler et al. suggest that school desegregation cases represent a bat-
tle over a point of view: what kind of a problem is racial inequality?20 4 It
was also a battle about responsibility. The NAACP/LDF use of social sci-
ence evidence in school desegregation cases was a strategy designed to
persuade the Court to conceptualize desegregation in terms of outcomes
rather than intentions. From this point of view, the affirmative action
requirement of Green06 and the racial balance criterion of Swann2. 7 repre-
sent public law models of adjudication whereby the Court, apprised of a
social problem requiring address, sanctioned orders that required policy
formulation and implementation. In the northern cases, however, the
Court drew back from the logic of this approach. By preserving the de
jure ide facto distinction and refusing to accept the social science based
argument that segregation was a "harm" per se, the Court returned to a
private-law model at least as far as issues of liability are concerned.2 0 9 Mil-
liken II, in which the Court refused to sanction a metropolitan remedy
for an intradistrict violation, is fully consistent with this approach.210 In
remedial terms, however, as the Ohio cases demonstrate, the Court con-
tinued to sanction system-wide remedial decrees characteristic of a public
law results-oriented approach 211 until the 1990s termination cases, by
which time the priority of the Court was no longer social change but
legitimacy and the propriety of continuing judicial supervision of state
affairs.21 2
203. Jenkins v. Missouri (Jenkins II), 19 E3d 393,404 (8th Cir. 1994).
204. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 33, at 203.
205. Id. at 37.
206. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
207. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
208. See also Fiss, supra note 38.
209. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
210. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744,746,748,752 (1974).
211. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)("Where a racially discriminatory school
system has been found to exist, Brown II imposes a duty on local school boards to 'effec-
tuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system. Brown 1I was a call for
the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems' and school boards operating such systems
were 'clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch.' Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues
the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.")(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
294,301 (1955) and Green v. County Sch. Bd., 349 U.S. 430,437-38 (1968)).
212. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). See also Missouri v.Jenkins(Jenkins III),
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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F The Changing Priorities of Constitutional Adjudication
The Court has never articulated a theory of desegregation which
can adequately explain either the contradictions inherent in the above
account or the role that social science should play in constitutional adju-
dication.2  In an attempt to do both, Dworkin has distinguished between
what he terms the causal and interpretive judgments of social sciences.
The former, he argues, derive from observation and, without a mechanical
model of causation, rest upon statistical correlations which are susceptible
to fluctuation and have no resonance in the normal vocabulary of consti-
tutional adjudication . However, judgments about the nature of a
community's response to a particular social phenomenon or practice-
such as segregation-are interpretive judgments of the kind regularly em-
ployed by the judiciary in constitutional adjudication:
"Interpretive judgments are not foreign to the judge; they
don't draw on a kind of technology that is for him arcane. On
the contrary, they draw upon the same kinds of skills, and are
indeed identical in their structure, with the judgment that a
judge makes when he draws from a line of precedent a charac-
terization that seems to him a more sensitive characterization
of the precedents than any other!
2' 6
If, as Dworkin argues, the Equal Protection guarantee of the Consti-
tution is a commitment that the government, in making political
decisions, will treat each individual with equal concern and respect, and
the judicial decision to require government to take affirmative action to
desegregate reflects the Court's judgment that the political process at any
particular time cannot be relied upon to secure that guarantee,1 7 then two
things become clear and an explanation for the changing attitude of the
Court emerges. Interpretive judgments of social science may have done
much to convince the federal judiciary first of the social consequences of
"the Negro problem" and the value of integration as an appropriate re-
sponse and then of the "web of segregation" that renders political process
an unreliable mechanism of change.Justice Thomas's comments in Jenkins
III, however, reflect a clear perception that forty years after Brown the
213. Yudof, supra note 196, at 87 ("Indeed it has done all that is within its power to obfus-
cate the underlying bases of its decisions."). See also id. for a discussion of theoretical
models; James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-out" School Desegregation Explained, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Susan P Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEo.L.J. 1355, 1357 (1991) (stating that "The remedial process in public law litigation is a
practice in search of a theory.").
214. Dworkin, supra note 41, at 20-26.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 21.
217. See id. at 24-26.
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interpretive assumptions of "Negro inferiority" which underpinned the
judicial mandate for affirmative action were outdated, while the causal
judgments concerning segregation's lingering effects were no longer suffi-
ciently reliable to warrant continuing departure from the norms of
federalism and judicial deference to elected legislatures that otherwise set
limits to the legitimacy of judicial interference with state and federal af-
fairs." 8
In the schools affirmative action cases that came before the Supreme
Court in the 2006-2007 Term,219 hopes that the Court would afford a
favorable reception to social science submissions, as it had in the case of
the University of Michigan Law School admission policies, were
dashed.22 Despite extensive social science submissions on both sides, the
plurality chose not to enter the debate, basing their decision upon the
primacy of the "color-blind constitution" in a non-desegregation situa-
221tion.
The affirmative action cases differ from the desegregation cases in
that they do not as yet directly engage the question of remedy. At issue is
the legitimacy of policies of racial preference in the pursuit of racial di-
versity and the extent to which, more than fifty years after Brown, a Court
in retreat from an activist model of adjudication should be willing to lend
constitutional legitimacy to integrative social policies underpinned by
contestable social science.222 For the Seattle Court, the distinction be-
218. Missouri v. Jenkins Uenkins IlI), 515 U.S. 70, 114, 138 (1995)(Thomas, J., con-
curring)("It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that
anything that is predominantly black must be inferior. We must forever put aside the no-
tion that simply because a school district today is black, it must be educationally
inferior.").
219. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007).
220. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The majority opinion accepted the
testimony of amid who included business and military leaders as well as social scientists
concerning the educational benefits of racial diversity. "The Law School's claim of a com-
pelling interest is further bolstered by its amici who point to the educational benefits that
flow from student body diversity" Id. at 333. "These benefits are not theoretical but real, as
major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas and viewpoints" Id. at 333-34. "High-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military assert that, 'based on [their] decades of experience, a
'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principal mission to provide national security" Id. at 331.
221. Parents Involved in Cnty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2755-8,2765-68.
222. Id. at 2778-9 (Thomas, J., concurring)(stating that the constitutionality of the
school boards' race-conscious policies should not be left "at the mercy of elected govern-
ment officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. To adopt
[such an approach] would be to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities.").
The Grutter majority had been careful to bolster its reliance on social science with
the opinion of business and military leaders on the benefits of racial diversity, while Justice
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tween "integration" and "desegregation" was clear. School boards act un-
constitutionally if they seek to perpetuate the "hard won gains" of the
desegregation era by race-conscious programs to combat "resegregation"
that is not directly attributable to state action.223 The divisions within the
Court were predictable. For Justice Breyer, the school board plans "repre-
sented local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated
'24education" that was the promise of Brown .justice Kennedy was pre
pared to recognize the compelling nature of state action to further the
nation's "historic commitment" to equal educational opportunity for all;
2'
but, for Justice Thomas, once again the "tenuous ' 226 or "far from appar-
ent ' 227 link between racial balance and improved educational outcomes
for black children did not justify unconstitutional race-based experiments
to achieve socially desirable ends: "this Court does not sit to 'create a soci-
ety that includes all Americans' or to solve the problems of 'troubled inner
city schooling We are not social engineers. 228
Thomas in dissent dismissed the "faddish slogan of the cognoscenti" with counter- research
citations with contrary outcomes. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350,364 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
223. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
224. Id. at 2800 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2797 (KennedyJ., concurring)("This Nation has a moral and ethical obli-
gation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating equal opportunity for all its
children.").
226. Id. at 2778 (Thomas, J., concurring)("Given this tenuous relationship between
forced racial mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent can-
not plausibly maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let
alone makes it compelling.").
227. Id. at 2776 ("The dissent asserts that racially balanced schools improve educa-
tional outcomes for black children. In support, the dissent unquestioningly cites certain
social science research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scien-
tists. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational
benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.").
228. Id. at 2779 n.14.The court stated:
regardless of what Justice Breyer's goals might be, this Court does not sit to
"create a society that includes all Americans' or to solve the problems of
'troubled inner city schooling." We are not social engineers. The United
States Constitution dictates that local governments cannot make decisions on
the basis of race. Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects of
racial imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the Constitu-
tion forbids it.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas directly articulates the view that the "actual"
gain in these cases lies not in the elimination of racial imbalance but in the elimination of
state-enforced separation. "The dissent's assertion that these plans are necessary for the
school districts to maintain their 'hard-won gains' reveals its conflation of segregation and
racial imbalance." Id. at 2770 n.3. His opinion continues: "In the context of public schooling,
segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system to 'carry out a governmental policy
to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race! In Brown, this court declared that
segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
III. EDUCATIONVERSUS INTEGRATION IN BOSTON
One of the main arguments employed by the Boston school com-
mittee to justify its opposition to court-ordered desegregation was that of
usurpation of power.2 Judge Garrity's court plan and orders230 usurped
power the constitution had given to elected state officials; yet, as Judge
Frank Johnson has explained, so-called "judicial activism" in cases like this
was a function of abdication of civic responsibility.23' Federal judges faced
with official opposition were left largely to their own devices. The Su-
preme Court had declared war on "gradualism" and "freedom of choice"
and other overtly race-neutral policies which masked attempts to subvert
the effect of Brown, and indicated the broad parameters of the remedial
powers of district courts to fashion appropriate decrees where school au-
thorities default. It left the details to be worked out by district judges on a
case-by-case basis.
As Judge Frank Coffin 232 has pointed out, the process was unfamiliar
and far from standardized.233
Amendment ... [but] [r]acial imbalance is not segregation." Id. at 2769 (quoting Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971)). "Outside of the context of
remediation for past dejure segregation,'integration' is simply racial balancing." Id. at n.2.
229. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
230. I have been unable to ascertain the exact number. The court records are not
complete. Formisano gives a figure of 415 orders in eleven years. See RONALD P. FoRis-
ANo, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s 2
(1991).
231. Frank M.Johnson,Jr., The Role of Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA.
L. REV. 271, 279 (1981).Johnson asserts:
The remedy for judicial activism is a recognition that this trust is not one
solely for the judiciary. As long as government officials entrusted with re-
sponsibility for constitutional governance disregard that responsibility, the
judiciary must and will stand ready to intervene to the extent necessary on
behalf of the deprived. To avoid this intervention, all that government offi-
cials need do is confront their responsibilities with the diligence and honesty
that their constituencies deserve. Conscientious, responsible leadership will in
most instances make judicial intervention unnecessary.
Id.
232. Frank M. Coffin, The Frontier of Renedies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CAL. L. REV.
983,985 (1979).
233. It could also be extremely complex, presenting reviewing courts with consider-
able difficulties, vide the Fourth Circuit's abdication in Swann:
We understand that the record in the case is voluminous, and we would note
at the outset that we have been unable to analyze the record as a whole. Al-
though we have carefully examined the district court's various opinions and
orders, the school board's plan, and those pleadings readily available to us, we
feel that we are not conversant with all of the factual considerations which
may prove determinative of this appeal. Accordingly, we here attempt, not to
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The judge must find the best way to accomplish a goal, seek-
ing help not only from the parties but from court-appointed
experts and masters and from citizens' committees. In this case,
the district judge was concerned with such things as bus routes
and distances, appropriate white-black-other minority ratios
from specific schools, magnet schools, enrichment programs,
methods of transfer between schools, teacher recruitment, and
pairings of colleges and universities with specific secondary
schools. All of these issues ordinarily would be appropriate
grist for the relevant educational policymaking body, here the
Boston School Committee. Indeed, the function is very close
to legislative decision-making. Because the legislative authori-
ties would not act, however, the district judge was forced to
move beyond the traditional role ... and fashioned his own
remedy. 3
The immediate precedent for the Garrity orders came from the Southern
state of South Carolina, where District Judge James B. McMillan faced a
residentially segregated urban school system and a school committee un-
able or unwilling to produce an acceptable plan. Judge McMillan's
appointment of education expert Dr James Finger as court advisor was a
tactic which was subsequently followed by Judge Jack Weinstein in New
York as well as by Judge Garrity in Boston.2 " The court-ordered "Finger
deal extensively with factual matters, but rather to set forth some legal con-
siderations which may be helpful to the Court.
Swann, 431 F2d at 150.
234. Coffin, supra note 232, at 985.
235. Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 311 F Supp. 265 (WD.N.C.
1970) vacated in part, Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed., 431 E2d 138 (4th Cir.
1970), aff'd in part, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT
(1986)(for a discussion of McMillan's order); see also DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READING
WRITING AND RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOL (1995)(for a general
account).
As Schwartz points out, the choice of Dr. Finger reflected the practical difficulties
faced by judges and counsel in securing assistance from local educators who were unwill-
ing to testify for fear of antagonizing the school board. SCHWARTZ, supra at 14. It seems that
the first appointment of an educational expert in a schools case was by Judge Bohanon,
supervising the desegregation of the public schools of Oklahoma City. He appointed edu-
cation experts Dr William R. Carmack, Dr. Willard B. Spalding and Dr. Earl A. McGovern
to carry out a study and file a desegregation report which the court then adopted. See
Dowell v. Sch. Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 244 E Supp. 971,973 (WD. Okla. 1965).
For Judge Weinstein's orders, see Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F Supp. 699 (E.D. N.Y.
1974), and for the discussion by Special Master, See Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court-
house and into the Field: the Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REy. 707 (1978). For
Judge Garrity's appointment of experts, see Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass.
1975).
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Plan" which adopted "racial balance" as a criterion of desegregation and
compulsory busing as a strategy received Supreme Court approval in 1971
and provided a blueprint for Northern school desegregation.
2 36
Judge Garrity's court plan implemented, in September 1975, was es-
sentially a student assignment and redistricting plan on the Swann model,
with additional educational enrichment features of the kind later ap-
proved in Milliken II.23 The "political dynamite' 238 of both plans that
provoked controversy on the national stage and rioting on an unprece-
dented scale on the streets of Boston was the requirement for compulsory
transportation of students. 239 Busing in Boston became the focal point for• 240
school committee-led opposition to court-ordered desegregation. Both
the State plan, ordered into effect in September of 1974, and the Court
plan that took effect the year after required the busing of students out of
their neighborhoods to schools in another part of the city.2 1 The arrival of
buses carrying black children into white, mainly Irish working class South
Boston triggered the riots that made Boston the worst symbol of white
racism outside the South and saw state troopers join city police on the
streets and in the schools in an effort to restore order.242
A. The Campaign for Racial Balance in Boston
The lawsuit filed on behalf of black plaintiffs against the Boston
school committee on March 2 1972 did not come out of the blue.243 Dis-
236. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F Supp. 699 (D.C.N.Y. 1974).
237. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 275-76, 279 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216.
238. Schwartz, supra note 235, at 19.
239. SeeJ. ANTHONY LuKAs, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES
OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985); see also RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST Bus-
ING: RACE CLASS AND ETHNICITY IN THE 19602 AND 1970s (1991);J. MICHAEL ROSS &
WILLIAM M. BERG, 'I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH THE JUDGE'S ORDER': THE BOSTON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONTROVERSY, (1981).
240. See Lukas, supra note 248; see also Formisano, supra note 248; Ross & Berg, supra
note 248.
241. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. at 239. The Court plan required the busing of approxi-
mately 21,000 students. This number was an estimate based upon analysis by the court-
appointed experts. School committee figures had grossly over-estimated the numbers of
students in the system. See ROBERT A.DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN
INSIDE AccouNT OF THE BOSTON DESEGREGATION CASE,27-28 (1981).
242. In October of 1974, Governor Sargent's request for federal assistance resulted in
the 82nd Airborne Regiment, stationed in Fort Bragg (N.C.) being placed on stand-by
alert. See Ross &. BERG, supra note 239, at 263. Announcing his Phase II plan for imple-
mentation at school opening in autumn 1975,Judge Garrity noted that 166 state and local
police officers continued to be stationed inside South Boston High, with 134 stationed in
the vicinity during school hours. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216, 225 (D. Mass.
1975).
243. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 E Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
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satisfaction on the part of black parents with the poor level of instruction
available to their children predated the Morgan litigation by more than
one hundred years. Although de jure segregation had never existed in Mas-
sachusetts, the city of Boston had maintained separate schools for black
children since 1820.244 In 1849, the case of five-year old Sarah Roberts
became a cause cdlbre when her father took action in the state courts to
secure her admission to a white school. 24 The black school that she at-
tended was badly run down. An evaluation committee had reported to
the city that "the school rooms are too small, the paint is much defaced"
and the equipment was "so shattered and neglected that it cannot be used
until it has been thoroughly repaired. 246 Sarah had to walk past five white
elementary schools to reach it.247 The action was argued on her behalf by
anti-slavery campaigner Charles Sumner who advanced the argument of
racial stigmatization which, one hundred years later, found approval in
Brown .248 The case was ahead of its time and failed in the state Supreme
Judicial Court, with ChiefJustice Lemuel Shaw articulating the principles
of "separate but equal" that the Plessy court subsequently adopted.24  The
case symbolized the underlying assumption on the part of black parents
that, in a dual system which separated white children from black, the edu-
cation offered to their children would be inevitably inferior.
In June 1961, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimina-
tion examined the issue of student allocation. Its finding that there was no
intentional discriminatory practice on the part of the school committee
was rejected by NAACP leaders who called upon the black community
250
for support by boycott action. On February 26 1964, following a na-
tionwide week of boycotts, a "Freedom Stay Out" day in Boston was
supported by 22,000 students, a figure which represented over 20 per cent
of the city's 92,000 student population.2" The following month saw the
establishment of the Kiernan Committee consisting of 21 members
drawn from the ranks of university presidents, religious leaders and repre-
sentatives of labor and business, tasked with assisting the State Board of
Education to carry out a study of racial imbalance in Commonwealth
schools.25 2 The Committee's report, published on April 15, 1965, identified
fifty-five schools in the state and forty-five in Boston itself that were ra-
cially imbalanced, defined as having over fifty percent minority
244. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1849).
245. Id.
246. Quoted in KLUGER, supra note 99, at 75.
247. Roberts, 59 Mass. at 201.
248. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
249. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. at 209 as approved in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537,544 (1896).
250. See Ross AND BERG, supra note 239, at 47, 48.
251. Id. at 49.
252. Id.
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enrollment. In terms of educational effect, the report concluded that
racially imbalanced schools caused serious educational damage to black
children by "impairing their confidence, distorting their self-image and
lowering their motivation. 25 4 Moreover, the inferior educational facilities
in predominantly black schools further reduced the opportunities of black
children to prepare for the "professional and vocational requirements of
our technological society.
' 2
11
In 1965, when Governor John Volpe signed into law the Racial Im-
balance Act (RIA) Massachusetts became the first state to mandate racial
balance in its public schools. 2 6 In the course of the next seven years, nei-
ther the State Board of Education nor the federal government was able to
make the Boston School Committee produce an acceptable plan.257 The
State Board finally produced its own plan, ordered into implementation
by the state Supreme Judicial Court for September 1974 and which Judge
Garrity adopted as an interim measure until the Court could devise a
desegregation plan in accordance with Supreme Court mandate. Busing
was integral to both State and Court plans and, given the city's residential
patterns, an unavoidable desegregation technique as defendant school
committee Chairman Kerrigan himself testified. However, as Dentler
and Scott point out, the concept of "forced busing," like the neighbor-
hood school, was essentially a fabrication. 259 There was nothing
remarkable about school buses: they had been a fact of Boston school life
253. MASS. STATE BD. OF EDUC., BECAUSE IT Is RIGHT-EDUCATIONALLY: REPORT OF
THE ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON RACIAL IMBALANCE AND EDUCATION 2 (1965).
254. Id., as quoted in Ross AND BERG, supra note 242, at 50.
255. Id.
256. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, 5 37C, 37D (2008).
257. The State Board withheld state aid, giving rise to action in the state courts by
the school committee to release the funds and annual bills in the legislature for the repeal
of the RIA. See Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 E Supp. 410, 439 (D. Mass. 1974). A complaint
by a black parent to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination produced a
"cease and desist" order against the Committee and enforcement proceedings in the Supe-
rior Court, which remanded for a consideration of mootness, as the complaining student
had already graduated. See id. at 450. On May 28, 1974, an MCAD Commissioner re-
ported that the discriminatory practices continued and had not been eliminated. See id. at
451. Abortive attempts by Federal officials to secure compliance resulted in the withhold-
ing of Federal funds and enforcement action by the Department of Health Welfare and
Education (HEW). Id. at 421. Following a complaint by HEW, Administrative Law Judge
Ring found the city "in violation of federal statute." Id. "Judge Ring's decision was af-
firmed, with minor exceptions, by the final reviewing authority in HEW, In the Matter of
Boston Public Schools, April 19, 1974, which found that the city had been guilty of de jure
segregation." Id. For a general account see Ross AND BERG, supra note 239, at 63-66.
258. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216, 226 (D. Mass. 1975)(quoting Committee
Chairman Kerrigan, "There is no way it [desegregation] can be done without the forced
busing of children.").
259. ROBERT A. DENTLER & MARVIN B. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDE Ac-
COUNT OF THE BOSTON DESEGREGATION CASE 27 (1981).
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for many years prior to 1974 , while school committee zoning practices
ensured that "the 'neighborhood school' [had] been a reality only in areas
of the city where residential segregation [was] firmly entrenched' 26 The
rallying calls of "forced busing" and the "neighborhood school" were os-
tensibly neutral objectives behind which lurked the racism which the
black plaintiffs and their lawyers sought to expose: "just as the myth of
neighborhood schools gave its believers something 'neutral' to support, so
busing gave them something 'neutral' to oppose.,
2 62
Judge Garrity retained active oversight of the desegregation process
in Boston for ten years. The Court plan which he ordered into imple-
mentation was an ambitious attempt to overhaul and modernize the
outdated Boston public school system, and much was achieved. By the
early 1980s, however, the project was in trouble; a coalition of plaintiffs,
school defendants, teachers and parents combined to frustrate court orders
for school closings. 263 Support for racial mixing ebbed, undermined by
growing disillusionment with the ability of the desegregation process to
bring about lasting improvements to the quality of education experienced
by black children. 64 Influenced by the radical ideas of Derrick Bell and
Ronald Edmonds, 6 1 plaintiffs' counsel Larry Johnson began actively to
question the nature of the desegregation process and to advocate a "free-
dom of choice" plan focusing on educational equity as opposed to
"desegregation." 266 In so doing, he fragmented the plaintiffs' case and frus-
trated the consent decree negotiations that had been begun by State
Commissioner Anrig as a way of terminating court jurisdiction, but largely
to no avail. By this time, the "law of the case" was firmly established. The
260. Id. On their figures "over 30,000 out of an alleged 90,000 students had been
taking buses subways and taxis from home to public schools in Boston for many years
prior to 1974." Id. School Department figures for the school year 1972-73 showed that
10% of elementary, 50% of intermediate and 85% of high school students rode to school.
See Memorandum from Robert Dentler to the Masters: Commentary on Busing and
Student Transport (Feb. 24, 19 75)(On file with the University of Massachusetts, Healey
Library Archives and Special Collections, Garrity Papers, Series XXXVllf-Masters and
Experts: Dender & Scott Memos 1974- 1975 Folder 17).
261. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 FSupp. 410, 473 (D. Mass. 1974).
262. DENTLER & SCOTT, supra note 259, at 27.
263. For an account see DENTLER & SCOTT, supra note 259, at 93.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Ronald Edmonds et al., Desegregation Planning and Educational Equity, 17
Theory into Practice 12 (1978) and Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 H~Auv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
266. On February 23, 1982, Attorney Johnson wrote to Defense Attorney Simonds
withdrawing from the consent decree negotiations and stating his intention to develop an
alternative plan that would be more responsive to his clients' interests. See discussion in
Murninghan, supra note 31, at 108-09.
267. For an account of the difficulties of the Consent Decree negotiations, see Mor-
gan v. McDonough, Memorandum and Draft Orders Toward Closing Case No. 72-911-G
(D. Mass. 198 2)(on file with the University of Massachusetts, Healey Library Archives and
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case was a "race" case and not an "education" case.26 The consequence
was that, however sincere the judge's concern with educational improve-
ment might initially have been, the requirements of desegregation as
mandated by the Supreme Court set limits to the extent that this concern
could be realized, raising questions concerning the gains that Brown had
been able to achieve.
B. Lawyers Versus Clients: Should Brown Have Been Decided Differently?
In 1976, Derrick Bell, himself a former NAACP/LDF staff attorney,
published an important article asserting a conflict of interests between
NAACP/ LDF attorneys and the black plaintiffs whom they claimed to
represent.2 69 Black plaintiffs, he argued, wanted the best education for their
children, but litigators were committed to a strategy of integration as ra-
cial balance and paid insufficient attention to making black schools
educationally effective .27°A court desegregation plan requiring the trans-
portation of students over long distances in the interests of racial
integration which failed to materialize could not command the confi-
dence of black parents, if the schools and the education they provided
were of poor quality.27 Though not the first to make these arguments,
Bell's article-in effect advocating a return to the neighborhood school
policies in force in most school systems prior to desegregation-reignited
a debate about tactics within the NAACP/LDF which dated back at least
to 1935, when WE. B. Du Bois warned that "the Negro needs neither
segregated schools nor mixed schools.What he needs is Education.
2 7 2
As Yudof points out, whilst in the pantheon of constitutionally pro-
tected values the status of equal educational opportunity is secure,
consensus breaks down in the task of translating the general into the par-
Special Collections, Garrity Papers, Series XLd Miscellaneous: Postscript Orders 1978-88
Folder 72).
268. Transcript of hearing on April 10 1975, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 E Supp. 216,
226 (D. Mass. 1975)(No. 72-911-G)(on file with the University of Massachusetts, Healy
Library Archives & Special Collections, Center for Law & Education Papers, Morgan &
Hennigan Case Records 1964 -1994). In Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F 2d 265 (1st Cir.
1982), school committee appellants contended that the district court had exceeded its
legitimate role as the enforcer of a desegregation remedy and strayed into the realm of
general educational policy. The First Circuit observed that absent racial bias, dislike of a
desegregation proposal on educational grounds was not a valid reason for rejecting it. Id. at
276.
269. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470(1976).
270. Id. at 488.
271. Id. at 480.
272. WE.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328,
335 (1935).
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273ticular. Equal opportunity in the context of education can mean one of
three things: equal access (which requires absence of discrimination);
equal resources (requiring equal inputs in terms of financial expenditure
and availability of resources) or equal outcomes (measured in terms of
academic achievement). 274 As a litigation strategy, the third will always be
the least attractive, being dependent upon social science evidence that by
then was heavily politicized. The argument received short shrift in Jenkins
III on the basis that the District Court had not identified "the incremental
effect [of] segregation ... on minority student achievement," i.e. it had
not paid enough attention to the fact-finding exercise necessary to estab-
lish the required direct causal link between segregative acts and
continuing educational harm.27' In the absence of such a link, continuing
achievement disparities must be attributable to external factors which
were not the court's concern:
Just as demographic changes independent of de jure segregation
will affect the racial composition of student assignments, so too
will numerous external factors beyond the control of [the
school committee] and the State affect minority student
achievement. So long as these external factors are not the re-
sult of segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus.
Insistence upon academic goals unrelated to the effects of legal
segregation unwarrantably postpones the day when [the school
276committee] will be able to operate on its own.
The initial NAACP strategy was one of equalization. The campaign to
challenge the disparities in expenditure between white schools and black
schools in state courts on matters such as, for example, teachers' salaries
had received piecemeal success but left individual teachers exposed to
victimization while the ability of the state to rely on endless permutations
of possible factual situations made litigation an expensive long-term strat-
egy.277 The decision to press for access in federal courts represented a
change in tactic;278 the immediate success of Brown deflected attention
from the underlying assumption that integration in the form of access to
273. Mark Yudof, Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. Rav. 411, 412
(1973).
274. Id.
275. Missouri v.Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995).
276. Id. at 102.
277. See Cottrol et al., supra note 32, at 54. The tactic was to confront the State with
a "Hobson's choice": abolish the dual system or face bankruptcy. See also Tushnet, supra
note 99, at 102-4; Kluger, supra note 99, at 132; Greenberg, supra note 31, at 58. The
NAACP's first major victory in a federal court was Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938).
278. For a discussion see Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67
MICH. L. REv. 237 (1968).
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white schools would of itself bring about the objective of educational
enrichment. 2" Had the NAACP continued to press for educational equity,
the argument goes, the difficult questions of the legitimacy of race-
conscious action unlinked to fault would not have arisen. As it was, the
statement that "separate" was inherently unequal invited the conclusion
that all that needed to be done was to integrate. Once that had been ac-
complished, official responsibility for the education of African Americans
was primafacie discharged. s0
In the early 1970s, disenchantment with the failure of desegregation
to bring about measurable improvements in the quality of education ex-
perienced by many black children prompted a new strategy focusing on
funding. School expenditure is funded in most states by means of local
property taxes. The variation in property values within a particular state,
coupled with residential patterns which concentrate black families in
poor urban areas and white students in wealthier suburban areas, can lead
to serious disparities in the funding available to black students relative to
white students.08 Bell wrote that "many, including myself, decided that
given the difficulty of integrating black and latino students with their
swiftly fleeing white counterparts, we should concentrate on desegregat-
ing the money.
2 8 2
School funding suits had some initial success in state courts in Cali-
fornia, where the state Supreme Court ruled that the public school
funding system's heavy reliance on local property taxes caused substantial
disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue
available per pupil and thus invidiously discriminated against the poor and
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 8The
hope that equalized expenditure suits might substitute for racial integra-
tion suits was dashed when the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case from Texas,
ruled that education was not a fundamental right and wealth was not a• 84
suspect classification. The Texas system attracted mere rational scrutiny
as opposed to strict scrutiny and prevailed despite substantial disparities in
local school resources and differences in tax effort throughout the State.
Per Justice Powell, the system -which was similar to those employed in
virtually every other state-was not the product of purposeful discrimina-
279. Tushnet, supra note 106, at 105-37.
280. See generally DERRIcK BELL, SILENT COVENANTs: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM, 20-28, 186 (2004).
281. See generally DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (2001).
282. BELL, supra note 29, at 161.
283. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
284. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
285. Id. "The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is whether
the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. We
hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this standard." Id. at 55.
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tion against any class but, instead, was a responsible attempt to arrive at
practical and workable solutions to educational problems. 286
CONCLUSION
A. Towards a Theory of the Court Expert in Schools Desegregation Suits
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), the Supreme Court es-
tablished a constitutional basis for the moral responsibilities of the nation
in racial matters. The decision represented a defining point in the devel-
opment of race relations in the United States but the principles it rested
upon were ambiguous and the process of schools desegregation it inaugu-
rated depended on political processes which the Court could command
but not control. The constitutionalization of the desegregation mandate
ensured that the political struggles it spawned were played out in the
courts, but the inherent underlying ambiguity produced an open textured
jurisprudence wherein the requirements of desegregation changed and
the link between racial isolation and educational opportunity that under-
pinned NAACP demands for integration could no longer be assumed.
Fifty years after Brown, a Court in retreat from an activist model of adju-
dication was unwilling to lend constitutional legitimacy to integrative
social policies underpinned by contestable social science.
For Judge Garrity and the lawyers involved in the Boston case, the
immediate answers to the questions with which this Article opened were
determined by reference to contemporary desegregation jurisprudence;
these actions were necessary because the Constitution so required.288
Where official action and policy had resulted in a dual system and free-
dom of choice would perpetuate the status quo, affirmative action was a
mandate, not an option.2 9 Racial balance in terms of student assignment
and faculty composition were indicia of desegregation and achievement
might require school closings.290 Magnet schools and educational enrich-
ment programs were legitimate techniques of enhancing "desegregative
attractiveness. '2 9 ' The latter might be required to combat lingering vestiges
286. Id. at 55. School finance litigation has had some success at the state level but as
Professor Ryan contends, it continues to be "hamstrung by the obstacles created by poor
race relations and the Court's desegregation jurisprudence." James E. Ryan, Schools, Race
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 255 (1999). See also Godwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School
Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 LAW AND INEQ. 81 (2006).
287. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2776-
2781 (2007)(Thomas,J., concurring).
288. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581,582 (D. Mass. 1975).
289. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1968).
290. Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
291. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 100-103 (1995). (stating that the
district court plan was designed to improve the desegregative attractiveness of the Kansas
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of segregation in matters of student achievement, in which case, however,
detailed fact-finding must be scrupulously undertaken and the duration
must be limited.292 The curriculum was a legitimate area for scrutiny but,
in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent, teaching and learning
were pedagogical issues which were properly left to the State. Academic
tracking or ability grouping, however, which might mask discriminatory
intent, would not normally be permissible.9
As Forbes Bottomley, himself a former superintendent of schools in
Seattle, Washington, has pointed out, an effective desegregation plan for a
complex public school system such as that of Boston is more than a mat-
ter of jurisprudence.294 Lawyers may be comfortable with standards
couched in terms of "reasonableness" and "adequacy," but educational
planners need more detailed guidance. 295 Translation from constitutional
guidelines to specific proposals of design and implementation requires
both professional expertise and a working relationship with the educa-
tional planners and school officers whose job it is on the ground to give
effect to the orders of the court.2 96 Where, as in Boston, school officials are
recalcitrant and administrative default forces the judge to take over, the
relationship can become "complex and frustrating."297 The appointment of
court experts in Boston extended the reach of the judge beyond the
courtroom and the confines of the adversarial process, and so their role
was part of the machinery of implementation. But in taking on the task of
supervising and supplying the educational planning expertise necessary to
devise and implement a workable plan, they shaped and gave content to
the desegregation process in Boston and, to that extent, their role was
more fundamental.
In identifying the importance of educational enhancement in a de-
segregation remedy, Judge Garrity's plan went further than any of his
predecessors in federal desegregation suits and became the prototype for a
new type of desegregation planning in which educational concerns were
ostensibly as important as issues of student assignment.2 98 Ultimately, the
educational component fell victim to a desegregation jurisprudence con-
City, Missouri (KCMSD), School District but was "so far removed from the task of elimi-
nating the racial identifiability of the schools within the KCMSD that {...] it is beyond
the admittedly broad discretion of the District Court.").
292. Missouri v. Jenkins Uenkins II1), 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken 1), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
293. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 E Supp. 401,511-514 (D.D.C. 1967).
294. Forbes Bottomly, The Professional Educator in the Desegregation Suit, in LIMITS OF
JUSTICE: THE COURT'S ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 621,633 (Howard I. Kalodner &
James J. Fishman eds., 1978).
295. See id. at 633.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Robert A. Dentler, Iniproving Public Education: The Boston School Desegregation
Case 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 3, 8 (1975).
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ceptualized in terms of "race" and not "education" "Desegregation", said
the First Circuit,"is not a mandate to equalize schools. 299
Taking the failure of outcomes as a focus, this Article now takes the
indeterminacy of the term "desegregation" as a starting point towards a
theory of the role of the court expert in schools desegregation litigation. If
the term "desegregation" is seen as inherently indeterminate, or, to borrow
a term from discourse theory, an empty or floating signifier whose meaning
crystallizes only as the general is translated into the particular, then a
framework for analysis emerges.3 OThe desegregation process becomes a
forum for a negotiation between representatives of two professional dis-
courses with differing and sometimes conflicting understandings and
conceptualizations of what the process might require.
From this perspective, the court expert operates at the interface be-
tween two discursive imperatives: the so-called "harm-benefit thesis" of
social science which seeks integration as a solution to "the Negro prob-
lem" and the legal imperative which prioritizes "legitimacy" and permits
"integration" only as an aspect of remedial process. The two imperatives
came together in the context of education, and both sets of professionals
sought enhanced educational outcomes for African Americans; but, for
lawyers, the harm which shaped strategy was racial discrimination whilst
for social scientists the harm was racial separation.
In the forum of the federal courtroom, the discourses of law and the
social sciences do not meet on an equal footing. The authority of the
modern liberal state is defined in legal terms, and answers to questions of
legitimacy are sought by reference to the concepts and rhetoric of legal
discourse. Thus, in terms of an interaction between the rival discourses of
the law and of the social sciences, it is the former which is dominant
and hegemonic. The discourse of the social sciences acquires political
legitimacy only to the extent that it has been subsumed within the dis-
course of law. 3 1 The role of the court expert can be theorized in terms
of mediation or translation, the task being to give to the federal judge the
content that he needs to give meaning to the otherwise indeterminate
signifier "desegregation." The voice of legitimacy is the voice of the fed-
eral judge and his attempts to articulate the boundaries of the term
represent so-called nodal points for the crystallization of meaning.
In this context, the relationship between the judge and the expert is
dialectical: the judge has to guide the expert on "the law." This requires
identification of the general legal principles which regulate the exercise of
299. Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F 2d 265,267 (1st Cir. 1982).
300. For a series of essays on the value of discourse theory as an analytical perspective
in social and political analysis see DiscouRSE THEORY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS: IDENTITY
POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE (David Howarth and Jacob Torfing eds., 2005).
301. See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 4-25 (1989)(for an analysis
of the "power of law" to not only define what constitutes legal discourse but also to as-
similate "truths" from other discourses).
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the judicial function, and the specific principles of constitutional liability
and relief which have been provided by the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts in previously-decided cases. These give the judge his "road map";
from these he identifies his imperatives and sets an agenda. Translation of
these imperatives into proposals for practical changes in educational policy
and practice is the task of the expert, who may be a testifying witness or
may be a specially appointed court adviser. Either way, these proposals are
acceptable only to the extent that they can be justifiable in terms of legal
discourse. In other words, the practical proposals of the social scientist
must be capable of translation into the language of the law and justifiable
by reference to the legal signifiers to which they give content. The meas-
ure of accomplishment is the scrutiny of the wider legal community as
represented in the first instance by the appellate judges to whose author-
ity appeal might lie. Ultimately, however, the effect is to bring about a
transfer of power from elected school officials to the wider group of aca-
demic and practicing lawyers and the politicians and representatives of
business interests with whom they interact who collectively make-up the
hermeneutic community that Dworkin has identified as the community
of legal discourse.0 2
302. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52, n.2 (1986) (identifying the philoso-
phical foundations of creative interpretation and paying tribute to the influence of
H.G. Gadamer).
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